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While the role of research and development and innovation in spurring economic growth is well 
recognized, many aspects of the R&D-innovation-growth nexus and their policy implications remain 
insufficiently understood. At a very basic level, there is the challenge of measuring how expenditure 
on R&D and innovation turn into knowledge capital and how knowledge capital affects economic 
growth. The companion issue (Volume 14, Number 1) to this issue of the EIB Papers discussed these 
questions. In addition, it also covers the possibility that due to knowledge spillovers, firms want to 
invest less in R&D and innovation than they should from society’s perspective, triggering the question 
of whether and how economic policies can raise firms’ expenditure on R&D and innovation.
This issue (Volume 14, Number 2) turns to another dimension of the underinvestment problem, 
namely the possibility that firms are unable to invest as much in R&D and innovation as they want 
because of financing constraints. While a possible lack of private finance for R&D and innovation is 
an ongoing concern, the recent financial crisis gives extra cause for concern – at least temporarily. 
To be clear, real-world financial markets can never be perfect, and imperfections might impede 
the financing of investment in general, not only investment in knowledge capital. However, it is 
reasonable to ask whether finance is more of a problem for investment in R&D and innovation than 
it is for other types of investment and, if yes, why. Zooming in on the subset of firms investing in R&D 
and innovation, it is worth examining whether firms are equally affected by financing constraints or 
whether some firms suffer more than others. For instance, new innovative firms might find it harder 
to secure finance than established firms. The distinction between “new” and “established” firms is, 
admittedly, a crude one and finer differentiations need to be made. But to the extent that the scale 
and scope of financing constraints systematically differ across firms, the type of finance suitable for 
overcoming such constraints might differ too. Likewise, the type of policy instrument suitable for 
unblocking investment in R&D and innovation might differ in line with the type of firm.
For obvious reasons, the European Investment Bank and its venture capital affiliate, the European 
Investment  Fund,  attach  considerable  importance  to  the  financing  of  investment  in  R&D  and 
innovation. After all, providing finance for sound investment when other sources of finance are 
insufficient is the raison d’être of the Bank. And to the extent that markets fail in bringing about the 
right level and type of investment, there is potential for the Bank to make a difference. While it is 
thus obvious that the Bank benefits from the wisdom put together in this volume of the EIB Papers, I 
am confident that they will serve a wider audience in Europe and elsewhere.
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The 2009 EIB Conference in Economics and Finance – held at EIB headquarters in Luxembourg on 
October 22 – examined the role of investment in R&D and other intangibles for innovation and 
growth and highlighted the importance of access to finance for innovative firms. It shed light on a 
number of policy-relevant issues including fiscal measures to boost R&D spending, the role of patents 
as an output of the innovation process and as a means to secure external finance for innovative firms 
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ABSTRACT
Bronwyn  H.  Hall ( b h h a l l @ e c o n . b e r k e l e y . e d u )  i s  P r o f e s s o r  i n  t h e  
Graduate School, University of California at Berkeley and Professor of 
Technology and the Economy at the University of Maastricht. She is 
also a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) in Cambridge (MA) and the Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. 
To  what  extent  are  new  and/or  innovative  firms 
fundamentally  different  from  established  firms, 
and therefore require a different form of financing? 
The  theoretical  background  for  this  proposition  is 
presented, and the empirical evidence on its importance 
is reviewed. Owing to the intangible nature of their 
investment,  asymmetric-information  and  moral-
hazard, these firms are more likely to be financed by 
equity than debt and behave in some cases as though 
they are cash-constrained, especially if they are small. 
Recognising  the  role  for  public  policy  in  this  area, 
many  countries  have  implemented  specific  policies 
to bring the cost of financing innovation more in line 
with the level that would prevail in the absence of 
market failures. 
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Bronwyn H. Hall
The financing of innovative firms
1.  Introduction
In a market-based economy, those who create and manage firms (entrepreneurs) are usually not the 
same individuals as those who have the means to finance this activity. This fact implies that there is 
likely to exist an information gap between those asking for funds and those supplying them. As will 
be discussed in more detail below, economists refer to the extra costs thus induced as arising from 
the problems of “asymmetric-information” and “moral-hazard”. Both of these are expected to raise the 
costs of obtaining finance from sources external to the firm. And although this will be true to some 
extent for all firms, the problem is particularly salient in the case of new firms and firms undertaking 
innovative activities.
Three different levels of difficulty need to be distinguished: the problems of existing innovating firms 
in acquiring sufficient funds for their investments, the reluctance of non-innovators to undertake 
innovation due to its high cost, and the problems faced by new start-up firms. Although all of these 
difficulties arise from the same ultimate set of causes, the empirical analysis of each will differ 
substantially and the possible range of policy solutions will differ. In particular, the first case, on which 
most of the econometric literature has focused, is subject to marginal analysis, whereas the second 
two cases involve the overcoming of (often substantial) fixed costs of entry into innovation. 
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical economic literature on the financing of innovation 
and draws some conclusions with respect to policy designed to ameliorate some of the problems.1 
Section 2 of the paper discusses the characteristics that make innovation investment different from 
ordinary investment. Then the theories of asymmetric-information and moral-hazard as applied to 
financing innovation are reviewed, followed by a summary of the empirical evidence on this topic. The 
concluding section discusses implications for public policy. 
2.  Why is investment in innovation different?
Investment in innovation usually consists of Research and Development spending (R&D), design and 
marketing expenses for bringing a new product to market, investment in the necessary new capital 
equipment, and investment in training.2 The relative importance of each of this varies with the industry 
and type of innovation, although the most important spending in most sectors is R&D, accounting for 
more than 50 percent of innovation expenditures. 
From the perspective of investment theory, innovation investments have a number of characteristics 
that make them different from ordinary investment. First and most importantly, most of the expenditures, 
with the exception of those on new capital equipment, consist of worker wages and salaries. From 
considerable survey evidence over the past 50 years, we know that in practice 50 percent or more of 
the R&D portion of this investment goes toward paying scientists and engineers, who are usually highly 
1  The paper draws from – and updates – an earlier survey (Hall 2002).
2    For example, the European Community Innovation Survey Wave 4 (CIS4) asks whether the firm has the following types of 
innovation expenses: 1) internal R&D; 2) external R&D; 3) acquisition of new capital equipment or software; 4) acquisition 
of external knowledge or know-how including licenses, IP rights, etc.; 5) training; 6) marketing; and 7) other expenses 
associated with launching new products or processes, such as design and engineering.
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educated. Their efforts create an intangible asset, the firm’s knowledge base, from which profits in 
future years will be generated. Added to this knowledge base is the specific human capital created by 
worker training in new products and processes and the knowledge created by design and marketing 
investments. To the extent that all this knowledge is “tacit” rather than codified, it is embedded in the 
human capital of the firm’s employees, and is therefore lost if they leave or are fired. 
This fact has an important implication for the conduct of R&D investment and to a lesser extent, 
innovation investment more broadly. The focus in the discussion below is on R&D as it is the measure 
on which empirical research has usually been based. Because part of the resource base of the firm 
itself disappears when knowledge workers leave or are fired, firms tend to smooth their R&D spending 
over time, in order to avoid having to lay them off. This implies that R&D spending at the firm level will 
behave as though it has high adjustment costs (confirmed empirically for the US by Hall et al. 1986; 
Lach and Schankerman 1988), with two consequences, one substantive and one that affects empirical 
work in this area. First, the equilibrium required rate of return to R&D may be quite high simply to cover 
the adjustment costs. Second, and related to the first, is that it will be difficult for empirical studies to 
measure the impact of changes in the costs of capital on such investment, because such effects can 
be weak in the short run due to the sluggish response of R&D to any changes in its cost. 
The above conclusion needs to be tempered somewhat by the observation that in the recent past, the 
variance of R&D spending growth in publicly traded US firms has increased somewhat, for at least two 
reasons. The first is the increased importance of the ICT sector, where there is fairly rapid obsolescence 
of R&D outputs, and a consequent reduction in the incentives to safeguard human capital (Hall 2006). 
The second is that markets for technology have become somewhat more important, which reduces 
the need to keep firm’s entire knowledge in-house (Arora et al. 2001). Nonetheless, it remains true that the 
variance in R&D investment growth rates is about one quarter to one fifth that for ordinary investment. 
A second important feature of R&D investment is the degree of uncertainty associated with its output. 
This uncertainty tends to be greatest at the beginning of a research program or project, which implies 
that an optimal R&D strategy has an options-like character and should not really be analyzed in a static 
framework. R&D projects with small probabilities of great success in the future may be worth continuing 
even if they do not pass an expected rate of return test. The uncertainty here can be extreme and not 
a simple matter of a well-specified distribution with a mean and variance. There is evidence such as 
that in Scherer (1998) that the distribution of profits from innovation sometimes takes the form of a 
Pareto distribution where the variance does not exist.3 When this is the case, standard risk-adjustment 
methods will not work well. Looked at from the perspective of standard finance theory, the variance 
of a portfolio constructed from such assets is unbounded so the usual diversification analysis does not 
apply. 
High uncertainty of returns to innovation has been exacerbated in the recent past by the rise of network, 
or “winner-take-all” industries, such as software or Web-based services. Examples such as Microsoft, 
Goggle, Yahoo, eBay, and now Facebook are familiar – these are characterized by very high returns to 
the initial investment, but there are a number of similar entrants who either fail or never reach critical 
mass and settle for a small niche of the market. In fact, the high returns experienced by a few firms do 
succeed in attracting a number of entrants, but there is no guarantee that it is the “right” number.
An important characteristic of uncertainty for the financing of investment in innovation is the fact that 
as investments are made over time, new information arrives, which reduces or changes the uncertainty. 
3    The simplest Pareto distribution is a one-parameter probability distribution with the property that under certain values of 
the parameter the variance of the outcomes drawn according to such a distribution is infinitely large.
R&D investments require 
higher average rates 
of return due to higher 
adjustment costs and 
greater uncertainty.
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The consequence of this fact is that the decision to invest in any particular project is not a once and 
for all decision, but has to be reassessed throughout the life of the project. In addition to making such 
investment a real option, the sequence of decisions complicates the analysis by introducing dynamic 
elements into the interaction of the financier (either within or without the firm) and the innovator. 
The final characteristic of R&D as investment that has implications for financing is that the “capital” 
thus created is intangible. Not only is it intangible, but as discussed above, much of it is in the form of 
human capital embedded in the heads of the employees. Such capital typically has relatively low 
salvage value because it is also idiosyncratic – for example, the fact that the firm owning the capital 
goes out of business is a signal that its value turned out to be low. Except for the type of effort now 
underway to harvest patents from such firms (e.g., Ocean Tomo or Intellectual Ventures), there is little 
market for distressed intangible assets. The human capital involved goes with the employee, and 
usually he or she will capture any residual value from that in the form of wages in future employment. 
Thus debt instruments that are secured by the value of the capital asset are not likely to provide a 
useful source of funding for R&D. See Harhoff (2009) for a description of recent efforts to change this 
situation via the creation of patent funds for the commercial exploitation of unused inventions. 
Summarizing, R&D and other innovation investments have the following characteristics: (i) they need 
to be smoothed in order to retain valuable employees and their knowledge; (ii) they are highly uncertain 
and information about success or failure is revealed over time; and (iii) they create an idiosyncratic 
intangible capital with a limited resale market. The next section of the paper reviews the theory of 
investment in the light of these characteristics and discusses the implications of the theory for the 
financing of innovation. 
3.  Theoretical framework: Is finance different for innovative firms?
What follows focuses on the analysis of ongoing innovative firms rather than new start-ups. The greater 
part of empirical work has been performed using data on these kinds of firms, partly because they 
perform the great bulk of R&D and partly due to data availability.4 The start-up problem will be discussed 
later in the paper. 
The usual starting point for the analysis of any type of investment financing is the “neo-classical” 
marginal profit condition, suitably modified to take the special features of R&D into account. This 
condition sets the marginal product of capital equal to the rate of return on investment in that capital. 
Ignoring adjustment costs and uncertainty for the moment, the discrete time cost-of-capital condition 
is the following:
MPK =  t – =
(1–δ )
(1–ρ )
c t p t+1 p
That is, the marginal product of capital (MPK) that is used during period t is equal to its price less what 
the firm would receive from selling the capital at t+1 (which is (1-δ) pt+1), discounted by the required 
rate of return ρ. ρ is the return received by the investor, which is after corporate taxes are paid but 
before any personal or capital gains taxes are paid. 
The above formulation implicitly contains three factors that will affect R&D financing: the rate at which 
the knowledge capital thus created depreciates or becomes obsolescent, the required rate of return, 
and rate of change of the real R&D price (the price of R&D inputs relative to the price of the firm’s output). 
4    Firms with more than 250 employees account for 90 percent of R&D worldwide (OECD 2007). 
The capital created by 
R&D is largely intangible 
and firm-specific, 
limiting its resale market 
value.
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It is obvious that higher depreciation rates increase the cost of capital, while lower post-corporate-tax 
required returns, as in the case of an R&D tax credit, would lower it. In addition, if R&D is expected to 
become relatively more expensive tomorrow (pt+1 > pt), this lowers the cost of capital today but this 
effect is relatively small in practice. 
The required rate of return in the equation above is the return after corporate taxes have been paid. 
However, as Auerbach (1984), among others, has shown, the marginal source of financing used by the 
firm will also impact the required rate of return that a prospective investor perceives. He analyzed the 
US case, where interest expense is deductible to the corporation, and the tax on capital gains has 
generally been lower than that on dividends. The same type of analysis would apply whenever profits 
from longer holding periods are taxed at a lower rate than those from shorter holding periods. The 
table below shows the cost of financing based on source of finance that he derived; in general, tax 
considerations suggest that debt finance will be cheapest, followed by retained earnings, and lastly 
by new share issues. 
Table 1.  Tax-adjusted financing cost
Source of finance Cost of finance Assumptions
Debt ρ (1-τ) Interest is deductible at the corporate level
Retained earnings ρ (1-τp)/(1-τc)
Avoids personal tax on dividends in favour of 
eventual capital-gains tax
New share issues ρ /(1-τc) Eventual capital-gains tax paid
ρ= required return; τ = corporate tax rate; τp = personal tax rate;   τc = capital-gains tax rate
Source: Auerbach (1984)
Obviously the story does not end here. Implicitly in constructing this table I have assumed that there 
is a single risk-adjusted rate of return available, but we have already seen that this is unlikely to be true, 
given the degree of uncertainty faced by innovating firms. That is, some innovation investments are 
so risky that a simple risk-adjustment based on the variance of returns is not available. In addition, 
different types of investors are likely to prefer different risk profiles. Bondholders will care more about 
salvage value (which also favours tangible over intangible assets), whereas equity holders may see an 
unbounded upside to the returns and may therefore prefer risk. 
Two other major reasons for differences in the required rate of return across financing source have 
been the subject of considerable theoretical and empirical interest, on the part of both industrial 
organization and corporate finance economists: asymmetric-information and moral-hazard. These 
factors are widely viewed as driving a wedge between the cost of internal and external sources of 
finance, a wedge that is likely to be larger in the case of innovation investment than it is for ordinary 
investment.
One of the implications of the well-known Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958, 1961) was that a firm 
choosing the optimal levels of investment should be indifferent to its capital structure, and should 
face the same price for all types of investment (including investments in creating new products and 
processes) on the margin. The last dollar spent on each type of investment should yield the same 
The source of funds 
affects the required 
return on investment for 
tax reasons.
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expected rate of return (after adjustment for non-diversifiable risk). A large literature, both theoretical 
and empirical, has questioned the bases for this theorem, but it remains a useful starting point. 
Of course, there are a number of reasons why the theorem might fail to hold in practice. First, uncertain 
returns in combination with incomplete markets imply that insurance over all outcomes is not available. 
Second, the cost of capital may vary across the source of the funds either for non-tax reasons or for 
tax reasons. Finally, the cost of capital may also vary across type of investment (tangible and intangible) 
both for tax and for other reasons. 
Summing up, with respect to innovation investment, economic theory advances a plethora of reasons 
why there might be a gap between the external and internal costs of capital; these can be divided into 
three main types, of which the first two arise from market failures: (i) asymmetric-information between 
innovator and investor; (ii) moral-hazard arising from the separation of ownership and management; 
and (iii) tax considerations that drive a wedge between external and internal finance. The following 
three sections treat each of these in turn. 
3.1  Asymmetric-information problems
In the R&D setting, the asymmetric-information problem refers to the fact that an inventor or 
entrepreneur frequently has better information about the nature of the contemplated innovation 
project and the likelihood of its success than potential investors. Therefore the marketplace for financing 
the development of innovative ideas looks like the “lemons” market modelled by Akerlof (1970). In his 
model, the good (used) cars sells for a lower price in order to compensate the buyer for the possibility 
that the car is a lemon. In this setting, the seller of potential returns to R&D or innovation offers a higher 
return (lower price) to compensate the buyer for the possibility that the project is not as good as is 
claimed. The lemons’ premium for R&D or innovation will be higher than that for ordinary investment 
because investors have more difficulty distinguishing good projects from bad when the projects are 
long-term R&D investments than when they are short-term or low-risk projects (Leland and Pyle 1977).
In the most extreme version of the lemons model, the market for R&D projects may disappear entirely 
if the asymmetric-information problem is too great. Informal evidence suggests that some potential 
innovators believe this to be the case in practice. Reducing information asymmetry via fuller disclosure 
is of limited effectiveness in this arena, due to the ease of imitation of inventive ideas. Firms are reluctant 
to reveal their innovative ideas to the marketplace and the fact that there could be a substantial cost 
to revealing information to their competitors reduces the quality of the signal they can make about a 
potential project (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Anton and Yao, 1998). Thus the implication of 
asymmetric-information coupled with the costliness of mitigating the problem is that firms and inventors 
will face a higher cost of external than internal capital for R&D due to the lemons’ premium. When the 
level of R&D expenditure is an observable signal subject to external audit, as it is under current 
accounting rules in several countries, we might expect that the lemons’ problem is somewhat mitigated, 
but certainly not eliminated.
Asymmetric-information problems can sometimes be mitigated by reputations developed through 
repeated interactions and this setting is no exception. There are several forms of reputation-building 
observed. One of the important roles played by specialized venture capital (VC) funds is precisely to 
supply informed monitoring of early stage technology start-ups, but experienced venture capitalists 
will also have developed a reputation for honouring nondisclosure agreements that will enable them 
to gather better information about projects being proposed. On the other side of the transaction, 
serial entrepreneurs often face less difficulty in obtaining financing for new ventures, presumably 
because they have developed a reputation in prior start-ups.
External funds are more 
expensive than internal 
funds due to a ‘lemons’ 
premium, too.
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3.2  Moral-hazard problems
Moral-hazard in R&D investing arises in the usual way: Modern industrial firms normally have separation 
of ownership and management. This leads to a principal-agent problem when the goals of the two 
conflict, which can result in investment strategies that are not share value maximizing, and hence can 
lead to under or over-investment. Two possible scenarios may co-exist: one is the usual tendency of 
managers to spend on activities that benefit them but not necessarily their firm (growing the firm 
beyond efficient scale, nicer offices, etc.) and the second is a reluctance of risk-averse managers to 
invest in uncertain R&D projects.
Agency costs of the first type may be avoided by reducing the amount of free cash flow available to 
the managers by leveraging the firm, but this in turn forces them to use the higher-cost external funds 
to finance R&D (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Empirically, there seem to be limits to the use of the 
leveraging strategy in R&D-intensive sectors. See Hall (1990, 1994) for evidence that the leveraged-
buyout (LBO) and restructuring wave of the 1980s, viewed by most researchers as driven by the need 
to reduce free cash flow in sectors where investment opportunities were poor, was almost entirely 
confined to industries and firms where R&D was of no consequence. One reason for this fact may be 
that over-investment in R&D and innovation is not usually a major problem for ongoing managerial 
firms and therefore the discipline of cash-flow limiting leverage is unnecessary for restraining these 
kinds of investment.
According to the second type of principal-agent conflict, managers are more risk averse than 
shareholders and avoid innovation projects that will increase the riskiness of the firm. If bankruptcy is 
a possibility, managers whose next best opportunity is a job with lower compensation than their 
present job and potential bondholders may both wish to avoid variance-increasing projects that 
shareholders would like to undertake. The argument of the theory is that long-term investments can 
suffer in this case. The optimal solution to this type of agency cost would be to increase the long-term 
incentives faced by the manager rather than reducing free cash flow. Many innovative firms make 
heavy use of stock option compensation for this reason, although this solution comes with its own 
incentive problems. 
In the case of start-up firms, there is often a third type of principal-agent conflict, involving overconfidence 
on the part of the entrepreneur. When there is uncertainty and the probability of innovation success 
is revealed only gradually over time, the possibility of asymmetric-information and moral-hazard in 
the investor-innovator relationship creates further problems for achieving the optimal contract. For 
example, it is often observed that entrepreneurs or R&D managers wish to continue projects that 
investors would like to terminate (Cornelli and Yosha 2003), presumably because the possibility of an 
ultimate benefit to the entrepreneurs looms large and they do not face the investment cost in the case 
of failure. If they are also over-confident (as is often the case), they will be even more biased toward 
continuation. Asymmetric-information about the project will imply that the investor has relatively 
more difficulty than the innovator even in determining the probability of success. The combination 
of information rents and agency costs will lead to inefficient funding of projects over time (waiting 
too long to cancel them or cancelling them too soon) as well as to inefficiently low levels of funding. 
In a recent paper, Bergemann and Hege (2005) have analyzed these tradeoffs in a multi-stage investment 
financing decision under changing uncertainty, with renegotiation allowed. They look at the choice 
between relationship financing (where the investor is able to monitor the progress of the project 
accurately) and arm’s length financing (where the investor must rely on the innovator for information). 
Investors are able to speed up or slow down the rate of financing, depending on the progress of the 
project and their expectations of success. In general, Bergemann and Hege find that agency costs will 
Moral hazard also 
widens the gap between 
external and internal 
cost of capital.
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lead to non-optimal stopping rules for projects, stopping them too soon on average. Surprisingly, 
arm’s length contracts can lead to higher project values, because in these the investor can commit in 
advance to a stopping rule, which eliminates any benefit to the entrepreneur from attempts to prolong 
the project. 
3.3  Taxes and the source of funds
As discussed earlier, tax considerations that yield variations in the cost of capital across source of finance 
have been articulated by Auerbach (1984) among others. In many tax systems including that in the US, 
interest is deductible against earnings and the proceeds from equity held for longer periods is taxed 
at a lower rate. Therefore the cost of financing new investment by debt has been effectively lower than 
that of financing it by retained earnings, which is in turn less than that of issuing new shares.5 However, 
based on the discussion above, this ranking of the financing costs is unlikely to hold for the intangible 
assets created by innovation investment. Low salvage values relative to the original investment makes 
these assets unsuitable for debt finance in spite of the tax advantage, so that firms whose investments 
are mostly intangible will rely more heavily on retained earnings and equity.
Differential tax treatment not only obtains for the sources of funds but also for their use. The specific 
tax treatment of R&D and other innovation investments in most OECD economies is very different from 
that of other kinds of investment. Because R&D, marketing costs, training costs, etc. are expensed as 
they are incurred, the effective tax rate on the corresponding assets is lower than that on either plant 
or equipment, with or without various tax credits in place. The economic depreciation of innovation 
assets is considerably less than the depreciation allowed for tax purposes - which is 100 percent - so 
that the required pre-tax rate of return for such investment would be lower relative to ordinary 
investment. In addition, some countries offer a tax credit or subsidy to R&D spending and occasionally 
to other activities such as employee training, which can reduce the after tax cost of capital even 
further.6 
Thus the conclusions from the theoretical analysis of firm-level investment in innovation is that the 
presence of either asymmetric-information or a principal-agent conflict or both implies that new debt 
or equity finance from sources external to the firm will be relatively more expensive for R&D and 
innovation than for ordinary investment, and that considerations such as the lack of collateral further 
reduce the possibility of debt finance. Together, these arguments suggest an important role for retained 
earnings in the R&D investment decision. In addition, retained earnings may serve as a signal of future 
profitability. Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) have argued that positive cash flow may 
be more important for R&D than for ordinary investment, a proposition that has since received empirical 
support (see Section 4). 
A final important conclusion from the theory above is that whatever problems are created for the 
financing of innovative firms by asymmetric-information and moral-hazard are likely to be exacerbated 
in the case of young firms and start-ups. These firms are often the most reliant on external sources of 
finance and of course they have not yet developed reputations that would allow them to signal their 
quality adequately. Evidence that this is true in practice as well as theory is provided in Section 4.5. 
5    A detailed discussion of tax regimes in different countries is beyond the scope of this survey, but it is quite a common 
feature in several countries for long term capital gains on funds that remain with a firm for more than one year to be taxed 
at a lower rate than ordinary income. Yet even if the tax rates on the two kinds of income are equal, the inequalities will 
hold. Only in the case where dividends are not taxed at the corporate level (which was formerly the case in the UK) will 
the ranking given above not hold. 
6    See Hall and Van Reenen (2000) and Warda (2008) for details. 
New debt and equity 
finance from external 
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innovation than for 
ordinary investment.
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4.  Empirical evidence
Almost all of the empirical evidence for the presence of a wedge between internal and external finance, 
and the consequent underinvestment in innovation that is discussed in this section uses R&D investment 
as a proxy for long term investment or investment in innovative activities. There are good reasons for 
this – R&D is frequently the only measure of innovation that has been observed over long time periods 
at the firm level and it is highly related to innovative activities, at least in the manufacturing sector. 
The recent wave of innovation surveys in Europe and elsewhere is beginning to provide us with 
alternative measures, although thus far it appears that R&D still has greater predictive power for firm 
performance than the newer measures, at least where it is observed (Mairesse et al. 2006). Later in this 
section some results obtained using the innovation surveys will be presented.
In the discussion below, the empirical studies in this area are divided into two groups: those based on 
variations of an investment equation derived from economic theory (Sections 4.1 and 4.2), and other 
studies – mostly financial-market studies based on stock-price announcement effects on the impact 
of various corporate-governance settings on the financing of innovation (Section 4.3). The section 
concludes with a discussion of the evidence on the resulting capital structure of innovating firms. 
4.1  Investment-equation studies
For a firm already operating, the presence of “liquidity” constraints on their investment (ordinary as 
well as innovation and R&D investment) implies that they are unable to obtain funds from external 
sources to finance all the investment that they would undertake if they had sufficient funds available 
within the firm. Thus the usual way to examine the empirical relevance of the arguments in the previous 
section is to estimate R&D investment equations and test whether liquidity constraints or excess 
sensitivity to cash-flow shocks are present and perhaps more pronounced than for ordinary investment. 
This approach builds on the extensive literature developed for testing ordinary investment equations 
for liquidity constraints (Fazzari et al. 1988; Arellano and Bond 1991). It suffers from many of the same 
difficulties as the estimates in the investment literature (lack of good instruments to isolate supply 
shocks, measurement error, unobserved differences across firms, and so forth), plus one additional 
problem that arises from the tendency of firms to smooth R&D spending over time. 
The ideal experiment for identifying the effects of liquidity constraints on investment is to give firms 
additional cash exogenously, and observe whether they pass it on to shareholders or use it for investment 
and/or R&D. If they choose the first alternative, either the cost of capital to the firm has not fallen, or 
it has fallen but they still have no good investment opportunities. If they choose the second, then the 
firm must have had some unexploited investment opportunities that were not profitable using more 
costly external finance. A finding that investment is sensitive to cash flow shocks that are not signals 
of future demand increases would allow rejecting the hypothesis that the cost of external funds is the 
same as the cost of internal funds. However, lack of true experiments of this kind forces researchers to 
use econometric techniques such as instrumental variables to attempt to control for demand shocks 
when estimating the investment demand equation, with varying degrees of success. 
The methodology for the identification of R&D investment equations is based on a simple supply and 
demand heuristic, as shown in Figure 1. The curve sloping downward to the right represents the 
demand for R&D investment funds and the curves sloping upward the supply of funds. Internal funds 
are available at a constant cost of capital until they are exhausted, at which point it becomes necessary 
to issue debt or equity in order to finance more investment. When the demand curve cuts the supply 
curve in the horizontal portion, a shock that increases cash flow (and shifts supply outward) has no 
effect on the level of investment. 
R&D investment demand 
may be excessively 
sensitive to cash-flow 
shocks in liquidity-
constrained firms.
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However, if the demand curve cuts the supply curve where it is upward sloping, it is possible for a 
shock to cash flow to shift the supply curve out in such a way as to induce a substantial increase in R&D 
investment. Figure 2 illustrates such a case, where the firm shifts from point A to point B in response 
to a cash flow shock that does not shift the demand curve. 









































During the past several years, various versions of these methodologies have been applied to data on 
the R&D investment of US, U.K., French, German, Irish, and Japanese firms and possibly others. The 
firms examined are typically the largest and most important manufacturing firms in their economy. 
When does an increase 
in the supply funds 
lead to additional R&D 
investment?
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For example, Hall (1992) finds a large positive elasticity between R&D and cash flow, using an 
accelerator-type model and a very large sample of US manufacturing firms. The estimation methodology 
here controls for both firm effects and simultaneity. Similarly and using some of the same data, 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) look at a panel of 179 US small firms in high-tech industries and find 
an economically large and statistically significant relationship between R&D investment and internal 
finance. 
More recently, J. Brown et al. (2009) have shown that both cash flow and the issuance of public equity 
are very important for younger US firms during the period 1990-2004, while they have little impact on 
mature firms’ R&D investment. They focus on the high-technology sector (drugs, office and computing 
equipment, communications equipment, electronic components, scientific instruments, medical 
instruments, and software), which accounts for almost all of the increase in R&D during this period, 
and use Euler-equation methods with fixed firm effects and industry-level year dummies to remove 
most of the variation due to unobserved differences in firm characteristics and demand shocks across 
industry.7 A novel finding in this paper and a companion paper by J. Brown and Petersen (2009) is the 
increased importance of public-equity issuance in financing R&D in the United States, which doubtless 
reflects a shift in expectations on the part of investors during this period that lowered the cost of this 
kind of capital to the firm. 
Harhoff (1998) find weak but significant cash-flow effects on R&D for both small and large German 
firms, although Euler-equation estimates for R&D investment were uninformative due to the smoothness 
of R&D and the small sample size. Combining limited survey evidence with his regression results, he 
concludes that R&D investment in small German firms may be constrained by the availability of finance. 
Bond et al. (1999) find significant differences between the cash flow impacts on R&D and investment 
for large manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom and Germany. German firms in their sample are 
insensitive to cash flow shocks, whereas the investment of non-R&D-doing UK firms does respond. 
Cash flow helps to predict whether a UK firm does R&D, but not the level of that R&D. They interpret 
their findings to mean that financial constraints are important for British firms, but that those which 
do R&D are a self-selected group that face fewer constraints. This is consistent with the view that the 
desire of firms to smooth R&D over time combines with the relatively high cost of financing it to reduce 
R&D well below the level that would obtain in a frictionless world. That is, some firms do not find it 
worthwhile to begin an R&D program that they expect will have to be curtailed in the future due to 
financial constraints. 
Mulkay et al. (2001) perform a similar exercise using large French and US manufacturing firms, finding 
that cash-flow impacts are much larger in the US than in France, both for R&D and for ordinary 
investment. Except for the well-known fact that R&D exhibits higher serial correlation than investment 
(presumably because of higher adjustment costs), differences in behaviour are between countries, not 
between investment types, suggesting that they are due to differences in the structure of financial 
markets rather than the type of investment, tangible or intangible. This result is consistent with evidence 
reported in Hall et al. (1999) for the US, France, and Japan during an earlier time period, which basically 
finds that R&D and investment on the one hand, and sales and cash flow on the other, are simultaneously 
determined in the United States (neither one “Granger-causes” the other).8 In the other countries, 
however, both types of investment are causal for sales and cash flow, with little feedback from sales 
7    The Euler equation for investment is an equilibrium condition derived from the firm’s value maximization problem. It 
expresses the tradeoff between investing today and having one more period of production from the capital versus 
investing tomorrow and forgoing today’s production. 
8    Granger causality is a definition of causality in a time-series context that is due to the late Clive Granger. One variable 
“Granger-causes” another if its prior values but not its current values help to predict the variable in the presence of the 
variable’s own history. 
R&D is strongly 
correlated with cash 
flow and new public 
equity, especially in 
young high-tech firms.
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and cash flows to the two types of investments. Using a non-structural R&D investment equation 
together with data for the US, UK, Canada, Europe, and Japan, Bhagat and Welch (1995) find similar 
results for the 1985-1990 period, with stock returns predicting changes in R&D more strongly for the 
US and UK firms. Thus in all the countries studied, R&D investment is a predictor of increased performance 
contemporaneously (measured as sales, cash flow, or stock returns), whereas in the US and the UK, 
there is immediate feedback from the performance measures to R&D investment, which can be due 
either to liquidity effects or the positive demand signal from increased sales or cash flow. 
Bougheas et al. (2001) examine the effects of liquidity constraints on R&D investment using firm-level 
data for manufacturing firms in Ireland and also find evidence that R&D investment in these firms is 
financially constrained, in line with the previous studies of US and UK firms.
4.2  Studies using innovation survey data
Recently a number of authors, mostly in Europe, have combined innovation survey data and firm 
financial data in order to look more closely at the relationship between innovative activities and the 
presence of financial constraints. This endeavour is welcome given the fact that the prior work was 
confined only to R&D investment, but it has suffered to some extent from the fact that in order for a 
firm to experience financial constraints related to innovation, they must at least want to be an innovator, 
leading to substantial simultaneity between the two.9 Various approaches are taken to mitigate this 
problem in the studies described below. 
Savignac (2008) and Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2008) examine a simultaneous model of the two 
discrete states (facing financial constraints and innovating) directly, using a large sample of French 
firms. They do indeed find simultaneity between the two: binding financing constraints discourage 
innovation and at the same time innovative firms are more likely to face binding financing constraints. 
Using data on UK firms, Canepa and Stoneman (2008) find that the cost and availability of finance 
matters for innovation, especially for high-technology firms and for the smaller firms in their 
sample. 
W. Brown (1997) argues that existing tests of the impact of capital market imperfections on innovative 
firms cannot distinguish between two possibilities: (i) capital markets are perfect and different factors 
drive the firm’s different types of expenditure or (ii) capital markets are imperfect and different types 
of expenditure react differently to a common factor (shocks to the supply of internal finance). He then 
compares the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for innovative and non-innovative firms in the UK. 
The results support the hypothesis that capital markets are imperfect, finding that the investment of 
innovative firms is more sensitive to cash flow. 
Magri (2009) also compares the cash flow sensitivity of innovative and non-innovative firms, this time 
for Italian firms. She finds that investment in small innovative firms is more sensitive to cash flow than 
in small non-innovative firms, but that there is no difference for large firms. Note that this analysis is 
for ordinary investment rather than for innovation investment itself, but it is still suggestive of financial 
constraints for smaller innovating firms. 
Jensen and Webster (2009) look at the cyclical response to macro-economic conditions of success in 
commercialization of new products and services by Australian firms. The most important macro-
economic determinant of success is the cost of bank overdrafts (lower is better, obviously), followed 
9    This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the skip patterns in some versions of the innovation surveys mean that non-
innovating firms are never asked whether they faced financial constraints that prevented them from innovating. 
Financial constraints 
also hamper innovative 
activities other than 
R&D, and innovators are 
more likely to encounter 
financial constraints.
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by the interest rate, and the cost of R&D. In general, commercial success is pro-cyclical in their sample, 
although others have found some evidence that research itself (as opposed to development) is counter-
cyclical. 
4.3  Corporate-governance structure and the financing of R&D
The challenge for direct tests of the relationship between management and ownership structures and 
firm investment strategies is that in any given firm, the two have co-evolved to be adapted to one 
another, and therefore observed correlations do not admit much of a causal story. In particular, any 
attempt to look at variations in performance that result from variations in strategy and governance 
will struggle with the fact that selection for “fitness” tends to eliminate some of the experiments one 
might like to see. 
The usual way around this problem is to look for announcement effects, that is, for market reaction to 
information surprises or news that firms have not yet adapted to. The event study methodology is 
described in detail in Campbell et al. (1997). Briefly, it involves computing the returns to an investor 
from holding a share of stock in a firm during the 3 to 5 day period around the time that some news 
that affects the firm is revealed publicly. The returns computed are “abnormal,” that is, they are adjusted 
for the overall market returns during the same period. 
Both Alam and Walton (1995) and Zantout (1997) find higher abnormal returns to firm shares following 
new debt issues when the firm is more R&D-intensive. The argument is that the acquisition of new 
sources of financing is good news when the firm has an asymmetric-information problem because of 
its R&D strategy. Similarly, Szewczyk et al. (1996) find that investment opportunities (as proxied by 
Tobin’s q) explain R&D-associated abnormal returns, and that these returns are higher when the firm 
is highly leveraged, implying a higher required rate of return for debt finance in equilibrium. Of course, 
in both of these cases, the evidence is non-experimental and the links between the theory and the 
empirical tests somewhat tenuous, but the results are suggestive.
Evidence on the importance of agency costs as they relate to R&D takes several forms. Several researchers 
have studied the impact of anti-takeover amendments (which arguably increase managerial security 
and willingness to take on risk while reducing managerial discipline) on R&D investment and firm value. 
Johnston and Rao (1997) find that such amendments are not followed by cuts in R&D, while Pugh et 
al. (1999) find that adoption of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), which is a form of anti-
takeover protection, is followed by R&D increases. Cho (1992) finds that R&D intensity increases with 
the share that managerial shareholdings represent of the manager’s wealth and interprets this as 
incentive pay mitigating agency costs and inducing long-term investment. 
Some have argued that institutional ownership of the managerial firm can be conducive to more R&D 
by reducing the agency costs due to free-riding by owners that is a feature of the governance of firms 
with diffuse ownership structure. Others however have held that such ownership pays too much 
attention to short-term earnings and therefore discourages long-term investment.10 
There is some limited evidence that this may indeed be the case. Eng and Shackell (2001) find that 
firms adopting long-term performance plans for their managers do not increase their R&D spending 
but that institutional ownership is associated with higher R&D. In addition, R&D-performing firms tend 
not to be held by banks and insurance companies, at least in the US. These types of firms are presumed 
10    Institutions such as mutual and pension funds often control somewhat larger blocks of shares than individuals, making 
monitoring firm and manager behaviour a more effective and more rewarding activity for these organizations.
Incentives for managers 
can boost long-term 
R&D. Institutional 
ownership need not 
reduce it.
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to be poor at monitoring R&D performance. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1997) find that high institutional-
investor ownership does not lead to short-term behaviour on the part of the firm; in particular, it does 
not lead to cuts in R&D spending. Francis and Smith (1995) find that diffusely held firms are less 
innovative, implying that monitoring alleviates agency costs and enables investment in innovation. 
In a study of German manufacturing firms, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009) use patent data as an indicator 
of innovative activity and find the opposite result. Companies with dispersed ownership are more 
active in innovation as measured by patent applications, but patenting falls as leverage increases. They 
interpret this result as suggesting that leverage acts as a disciplinary device that restrains overinvestment 
by managers. Although they attempt to control for the endogeneity of leverage using instrumental 
variables, the instruments (lagged cash flow and tangible-asset intensity) are arguably also related to 
unobserved determinants of innovative activity; in the absence of independent measures of over- or 
under-investment, it is difficult to know whether leverage is a discipline device or merely an indicator 
that the firm is not as innovation intensive as some others.
In general, the evidence summarized above is fairly clear and indicates that long-term incentives for 
managers can encourage R&D and that institutional ownership does not necessarily discourage R&D 
investment. However, it is fairly silent on the magnitude of these effects, and whether these governance 
features truly close the agency cost-induced gap between the cost of capital and the return to R&D.
4.4  Capital structure and R&D
Another way to look at the financing-innovation nexus is to examine the capital structure that results 
from the financing decisions of R&D-intensive firms. Here the evidence that debt is disfavoured is quite 
clear. Work using US data such as Friend and Lang (1988) and Hall (1992) shows a clear negative 
correlation between R&D intensity and leverage. The same is true of unpublished results for European 
firms (Hall et al. 2009). 
Although leverage may be a useful tool for reducing agency costs in the firm, it is of limited value for 
R&D-intensive firms. As discussed above, because the knowledge asset created by R&D investment is 
intangible, partly embedded in human capital, and ordinarily very specialized to the particular firm in 
which it resides, the capital structure of R&D-intensive firms customarily exhibits considerably less 
leverage than that of other firms. Banks and other debt holders prefer to use physical assets to secure 
loans and are reluctant to lend when the project involves substantial R&D investment rather than 
investment in plant and equipment. In the words of Williamson (1988), “redeployable” assets (that is, 
assets whose value in an alternative use is almost as high as in their current use) are more suited to the 
governance structures associated with debt. Additional empirical support for this idea is provided by 
Alderson and Betker (1996), who find that liquidation costs and R&D are positively related across firms. 
The implication is that the sunk costs associated with R&D investment are higher than that for ordinary 
investment.
In addition, servicing debt usually requires a stable source of cash flow, which makes it more difficult to 
find the funds for an R&D investment program that must be sustained at a certain level in order to be 
productive. For both these reasons, firms are either unable or reluctant to use debt finance for R&D 
investment, which may raise the cost of capital, depending on the precise tax treatment of debt versus 
equity. Confirming empirical evidence for the idea that limiting free cash flow in R&D firms by issuing debt 
is a less desirable method of reducing agency costs is provided by Chung and Wright (1998), who find that 
financial slack and R&D spending are positively correlated with the value of growth firms, but not correlated 
with that of other firms. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009) find that more leveraged German firms have lower 
innovation output (measured by patents), especially when ownership of the firm is dispersed.
There is a clear negative 
correlation between 
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In the view of some observers, the LBO wave of the 1980s in the United States and the United Kingdom 
arose partly because high real interest rates meant that there were strong pressures to eliminate free 
cash flow within firms (Blair and Litan 1990). For firms in industries where R&D is an important form of 
investment, such pressure should have been reduced by the need for internal funds to undertake such 
investment and indeed Hall (1993, 1994) and Opler and Titman (1993) find that firms with high R&D 
intensity were much less likely to do an LBO. Opler and Titman (1994) find that R&D firms that were 
leveraged suffered more than other firms when facing economic distress, presumably because leverage 
meant that they were unable to sustain R&D programs in the face of reduced cash flow. 
In related work using data on Israeli firms, Blass and Yosha (2003) report that R&D-intensive firms listed 
on the US stock exchanges use highly equity-based sources of financing, whereas those listed only in 
Israel rely more on bank financing and government funding. The former are more profitable and 
faster-growing, which suggests that the choice of where to list the shares and whether to finance with 
new equity is indeed sensitive to the expected rate of return to the R&D being undertaken. That is, 
investors supplying arms-length finance require higher returns to compensate them for the risk of a 
“lemon”.
4.5  Young innovative companies
Before leaving this topic, I briefly review the evidence on the financing of young innovative firms and 
start-ups. At the macro-economic level and beginning with Rajan and Zingales (1998), a number of 
studies have related the overall financial development level with measures such as the entry of new 
firms in a country. Using a set of 16 countries including the US, European, and mid-level developing 
countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Aghion et al. (2007) show that the level of financial 
development in a country (private credit and the size of market capitalization) strongly influences 
entry and post-entry growth of small firms but has little impact on large-firm growth. 
These authors highlight the differences in the level of market capitalization between the US, the U.K., 
and a few Nordic countries on the one hand and continental Europe on the other. Although to some 
extent the growth of small firms and stock markets are endogenously related in that they grow together, 
the methodologies chosen by Rajan-Zingales and Aghion et al. are designed to minimize the identification 
problem that results, which makes their results robust. This work does not relate directly to innovative 
firms per se, but it is suggestive, as these are often very prominent among new firms, especially in the 
manufacturing sectors that are studied by these authors. 
An entirely different approach that looks directly at the cash flow impact on entrepreneurial firms was 
pursued by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994). Using tax data on US entrepreneurs (sole proprietors) some of 
whom received inheritances, they were able to show that the reception of funds from inheritance 
increased entrepreneurial survival and that those that survived grew faster, suggesting that such firms 
were financially constrained prior to the cash influx. Turning to R&D-doing and innovative small firms 
in particular, in most of the work reviewed in Section 4.1, when the authors have looked they have 
found greater financial constraints for these firms than for the larger firms in their samples. For examples, 
see Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and J. Brown et al. (2009). 
Of course, looking at smaller firms that have successfully entered but face some financial constraints 
is only part of the story. We would also like to know about entry that never takes place, or failure to 
innovate due to constraints. Here the innovation surveys can be helpful, especially if they survey non-
innovative firms carefully. For example, Canepa and Stoneman (2008) found that finance mattered 
especially for the smaller innovative firms in their UK sample, as does Magri (2008) for Italian firms. 
Audretsch and Lehmann (2004) examined the financing of young innovative firms on the German 
More developed 
financial-markets are 
conducive to faster entry 
and post-entry growth 
of small firms.
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Neuer Markt, finding a negative correlation between bank debt and VC financing. They also show that 
the VC-backed firms have much higher growth rates. They argue that these two findings show the 
importance of financiers willing to risk capital for the success of young innovative firms, especially in 
a country like Germany where bank finance dominates. 
5.  Conclusions and policy implications 
A number of conclusions have emerged from this body of theoretical and empirical work, conclusions 
that are fairly consistent across the various samples and methodological variations. It is perhaps 
important to emphasize that the market failures catalogued and explored here are confined to those 
due to the separation of owner and manager, or financier and entrepreneur. However, the principle 
public policy argument for subsidizing innovative firms may be different, as it is based on the social 
benefits to be derived from the unpriced knowledge spillovers from such firms. That is, the problem 
of inappropriability of the returns to investment in knowledge that was pointed out long ago by Arrow 
(1962) and Nelson (1959). The arguments and evidence here are in addition to these. 
First, there is solid evidence that debt is a disfavoured source of finance for R&D investment. Second, 
the “Anglo-Saxon” economies, with their thick and highly developed stock markets and relatively 
transparent ownership structures, typically exhibit more sensitivity and responsiveness of R&D to cash 
flow than continental economies. Third, and much more speculatively, this greater responsiveness 
may arise because they are financially constrained, in the sense that they view external sources of 
finance as much more costly than internal, and therefore require a considerably higher rate of return 
to investments done on the margin when they are tapping these sources. However, it is perhaps equally 
likely that this responsiveness occurs because firms are more sensitive to demand signals in thick 
financial markets; a definitive explanation of the “excess sensitivity” result awaits further research. 
Finally, there is now considerable evidence that young and/or small firms are more likely to face financial 
constraints than large established firms, a result that is not surprising, if the source of the problem is 
a “lemons” premium. Presumably such firms have a weaker track record on which investors can base 
their evaluations.
There are a number of policy implications from the results discussed in this paper. One implication is 
for governments to design policies conducive to lowering the cost of financing innovation, which 
many governments have done. The chief instrument in this area is a simple tax credit or subsidy, in 
some cases targeted towards small firms. Others include various programmes that are project related 
or targeted towards pre-commercial research and development (e.g., see David et al. (2000) for an 
international survey of this literature; Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) for a detailed study of R&D 
subsidies in Germany; and Hall and Maffioli (2008) for a survey of such programs in Latin America and 
their evaluation). 
One of the problems in designing policy in this area is that different countries face different problems. 
For example, although one can argue that financing constraints are not absent in the United States, it 
is fairly clear that the rise of the VC industry has mitigated the problem, at least for high technology 
start-ups (including those in green technologies). In other countries, creating such an industry may be 
more of a challenge. In Israel, for example, it appears to have been kick-started successfully by the 
government, but only on the second try (Gilson 2003; Avnimelech and Teubal 2004). 
Several European governments have also attempted to behave somewhat as VCs towards their own 
start-ups and small innovative firms. In Germany, more than 800 federal and state government financing 
Governments should 
lower the cost of 
financing innovation.
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programs have been established for new firms in the recent past (OECD 1995). In 1980, the Swedish 
government established the first of a series of investment companies (along with instituting a series 
of measures such as reduced capital-gains taxes to encourage private investment in start-ups), partly 
on the United States model. By 1987, the government share of VC funding was 43 percent (Karaomerliolu 
and Jacobsson 1999). Recently, the UK has instituted a series of government programs under the 
Enterprise Fund umbrella which allocate funds to small and medium-sized firms in high technology 
and certain regions, as well as guaranteeing some loans to small businesses (Bank of England 2001). 
In a recent theoretical paper, Takalo and Tanayama (2008) argue that government R&D subsidies based 
on screening of firms and projects can serve as important signals to private-equity markets and venture 
capitalists of the quality of the recipients, which will reduce to some extent the “lemons” premium 
demanded by non-government investors. Lerner (1999) studied US recipients of Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) grants and concluded the same: Receiving such a grant enabled firms to 
obtain more resources elsewhere, and in addition such firms grew faster afterwards, when compared 
to a matched sample of firms that did not receive funds from SBIR. This suggests an important role for 
government policy in screening firms for funding. 
For established firms, estimates of cash-flow sensitivity point to differences between the US and UK 
on the one hand and continental European countries on the other, with the former more sensitive than 
the latter, so in principle US and UK firms should be more subject to financial constraints. But there is 
little evidence that this leads to lower innovative activity, in fact somewhat the contrary, so other forces 
must be at work, too. The largest of these firms in all countries and the ones that perform the greatest 
amount of R&D tend to compete with each other in international markets, so that it is not likely that 
the behaviour of firms from different countries can diverge too far. 
Winning a competitive 
R&D grant might enable 
young firms to obtain 
more funds from private 
sources.
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ABSTRACT
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fellow at Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis. 
Venture  capital  is  considered  to  be  the  most 
appropriate  form  of  financing  for  innovative  firms 
in  high-tech  sectors.  We  provide  an  assessment  of 
venture capital looking at the involvement of venture 
capital with some of Europe’s most innovative and 
successful companies: those listed on Europe’s ’new’ 
stock markets. Venture capital is effective in helping 
these  firms  overcome  credit  constraints  but  has  a 
limited  effect  on  their  ability  to  grow  and  create 
jobs.  This  result  clashes  with  the  evidence  on  the 
role  of  VC  for  US  companies.  Yet,  VC  is  not  only 
about money but also about steering and supporting 
portfolio  companies,  activities  which  depend  on 
venture  capitalists’  educational  and  organizational 
background  as  well  as  on  the  legal  and  cultural 
environment in which they operate.  
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The role of venture capital in 
alleviating financial constraints 
of innovative firms
1.  Introduction
It has long been discussed in academia and among policy makers whether firms are hindered in their 
performance by the lack of finance. Researchers have documented through surveys that firms report the 
lack of provision of risk capital and the inefficient functioning of the financial markets as important obstacles 
to their growth, investment and innovation, justifying government intervention to alleviate financial 
constraints.
The success of US venture capital (VC) funds in supporting dynamic companies, which create jobs and 
wealth, brought many governments to look for ways to nurture a national venture capital industry. Several 
official documents of European governments and institutions suggest bolstering venture capital and 
revamping the regulation of stock markets as remedies to Europe’s economic sluggishness and dismal 
unemployment (e.g. European Commission 1998 and Committee of Wise Men 2001). At the same time, the 
high returns enjoyed by US venture capital firms induced venture capitalists to become active in other 
countries, too.
The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the role of venture capital in affecting innovative firm 
performance, thereby answering two relevant questions: firstly, how important is venture capital in 
alleviating financial constraints of innovative firms; secondly, what is the role that venture capital really 
plays in the financing of firms. To obtain a convincing answer we turn to firm-level data. In particular, we 
use evidence derived from two datasets that we have gathered and which are to some extent complementary: 
a dataset on VC-backed firms (Bottazzi and Da Rin 2002) and a dataset on European venture capitalists 
(VCs) for the period 1997-2001. Although rather comprehensive the data can not capture the more recent 
development of the VC industry.
The article is organized in six more sections. Section 2 discusses the extant literature and evidence on firm 
credit constraints. Sections 3 to 6 analyse the role of venture capitalists, in the financing of innovative firms, 
as well as the determinants of their investment style. Section 7 examines evidence on the role of VCs across 
firms in Europe and discusses the relationship between investor activities and performance. Section 8 
presents conclusions and policy implications.
2.  The evidence on credit constraints
Understanding the obstacles to firm growth has been a challenging aspiration of researchers in finance 
and economics. Researchers have documented that low government quality, macroeconomic instability 
as well as many features of the business environment are important impediments to firms’ growth. In 
particular, several papers have identified the important role of financing obstacles. Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) show that industries that are more dependent on external finance grow faster in countries which 
have been able to develop a better financial system. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) (hereafter BDM) provide evidence that firms consider the quality 
of the financial system and of the legal enforcement, as well as the level of corruption, as the three most 
important factors affecting firm’s external financing constraints. 
More recently, Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008) (hereafter ADM) use evidence from the 
World Business Environment Survey (WBES), a major firm level survey conducted by the World Bank in 1999 
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and 2000 in 80 developed and developing countries around the world.1 By comparing the economic 
relevance of the reported obstacles they find that finance, crime and policy instability are the most 
significant. 






























y = –0.738x + 2.877
Source:  ADM (2008)
Note:    ”Firm growth” is the percentage change in firm sales over the period 1996-99. “Financing” is an index of financial 
constraints which takes the value 1 to 4, with higher values indicating higher obstacles.
Figure 1 reports average firms’ growth (of sales) over the years 1996-99 in the 80 countries considered and 
the index of financing obstacles, which takes values from 1 to 4, with higher values indicating greater 
obstacles, averaged over all the firms in each country. The graph shows a significant negative correlation 
between firm growth and financing constraints. ADM discern which components of the financing obstacles 
can be deemed the most significant. They find that collateral requirements of banks and financial institutions, 
the need of a special connection with banks and financial institutions, the lack of money to lend by banks 
and the difficult access to financing for leasing equipment are all elements which significantly influence 
firms’ growth. Interestingly, the finance obstacle is binding regardless of which country or firms are included 
in the sample although larger firms are affected to a significantly lesser extent.
There exists also a more direct effect of the lack of finance. As documented by Haussman et al. (2004), the 
population of firms is itself endogenous, as financing constraints affect the creation of new entrepreneurial 
firms, while, as shown by BDM, firms’ size distribution adapt to the business environment. A large proportion 
of the literature in this area has concentrated on analysing the effect of financial variables (cash flow) on 
fixed capital investment. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) (hereafter FHP) use firm-level panel data 
on 427 US manufacturing firms from 1970 to 1984. They divide firms into three fixed categories (low, 
1  See Dollar et al. (2004), Gelb et al. (2007), Carlin et al. (2005) and Svejnar and Commander (2007).
Stronger financing 
constraints are 
associated with slower 
firm growth.
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medium, high) by the level of dividend payout, which is assumed to be a proxy of the financial constraints 
and estimate investment functions with cash flow and Tobin’s Q (where ‘Q’ represents the ratio of the 
market value of a firm’s existing shares (share capital) to the replacement cost of the firm’s physical assets) 
as explanatory variables. As long as Q reflects firm’s investment opportunities adequately, sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow could suggest that capital markets are not perfect and financial constraints matter. 
They find significantly larger estimated coefficients of cash flow for the low-dividend-payout firms than 
the high-dividend-firms. The correlation of investment with cash flow in “financially-constrained” firms 
has also been confirmed by several other studies with different cross-sectional criteria or with different 
countries’ panel data (Hoshi et al. 1991; Schaller 1993).
Subsequent research has addressed several problems involved in this empirical literature. There are some 
important issues. First of all, several researchers consider that a sufficient indicator for representing 
investment opportunities is marginal Q, which is the present value of expected future marginal returns to 
capital, and not average Q as in FHP (Whited 1992; Hubbard et al. 1995). Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) 
construct the expected value of marginal q conditional on observed fundamentals including cash flow 
(“fundamental Q”), by estimating a set of VAR forecasting equations. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) 
introduce financial friction into their model and consider two variables that affect investment, “fundamental 
Q”, the expected present value of future marginal productivity of capital, and “financial Q”, the expected 
present value of a future financial state variable of the firm. They find that investment is significantly 
correlated to both measures for the average firm in their sample and detect no sensitiveness of investment 
to liquidity for bond rating firms but find liquidity effects for unrated firms, small firms or low-dividend-
payout firms. Cummins et al. (2006), by using earning forecasts from securities analysts, construct more 
direct measures of the fundamentals that represent future profitability. Their surprising result is that internal 
funds are not correlated to investment spending even for selected firms, for example, those without bond 
rating or dividend payout, which have been found to be “financially constrained” in other studies.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) question the relevance of the country grouping implemented by FHP as well 
as their results. They re-examine 49 firms that are grouped as low-dividend-payout firms in FHP and further 
divide those firms into five categories, by their own operational classification criteria, based on statements 
contained in annual reports of these firms. They assume that a firm does not face “financing constraints” 
if it can invest more at a given point in time. Using this definition, they find that in 85 percent of all 
observations (firm-year pairs) of FHP’s sample, the firms are not financially constrained, since they could 
have increased their investment.
Bond et al. (2003) construct firm panel data sets for manufacturing firms in Belgium, France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom for the period 1978-1989 and estimate a range of investment equations (accelerator, 
error correction and Euler equation specifications) including additional financial variables (cash flow and 
profits) by using General-method-of-moment (GMM) techniques which control for biases due to both 
correlated effects and lagged dependent variables. Their main aim is to compare results for the same 
investment model across different countries. They find that financial variables play an important role in 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom. More robustly, cash flow and profit terms are found to be both 
statistically and quantitatively more significant in the United Kingdom than in other European countries, 
implying that financial constraints may be more severe in the more market-oriented UK financial system.
The issue of financing constraints is even more pertinent for innovative firms, given the nature of their 
products. Funding projects with external finance is costly to these firms due to the strong information 
asymmetry associated with innovative investments. R&D results cannot be easily used as collateral2 and 
most inputs to the innovative process are firm-specific or specific to the product developed. As a 
2  See Hall (1992). 
Investment is more 
sensitive to cash-flow 
variations in low-
dividend than in high-
dividend firms.
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consequence an external financier cannot expect to recover a significant share of the investment in case 
of an unsuccessful project. In addition, given the innovativeness of the projects, firms are unwilling to 
reveal the detail of the project. As a result, they may find it difficult and costly to raise external funds for 
their investment financing (Myers and Majluf 1984).
Hall et al. (1999) construct more comparable panel data of firms in the high-tech sectors in the United 
States, Japan and France. Using a VAR methodology, they test for causal relationship between liquidity 
variables (sales and cash flow) and investment variables (capital investment and R&D), and find that both 
capital investment and R&D are more sensitive to cash-flow and sales in the United States than in Japan 
and France. This result is quite comparable to that of Bond et al. (2003) and hints at financial constraints 
possibly being more severe in the United States or the United Kingdom with their market-based financial 
systems.
Empirically, the existence of financial constraints for innovative firms is most frequently investigated by 
examining the sensitivity of R&D investment to financial factors (Himmelberg and Petersen 1994; Harhoff 
1998; Mulkay et al. 2001). Most of these studies find a large and significant relationship between R&D and 
internal finance for small US firms in high-tech industries. The results for Europe are less conclusive (Harhoff 
1998). 
Could venture capital alleviate financial constraints of innovative firms?
3.  The role of venture capital
There exists a wide consensus among economists, business leaders and policy-makers that a vibrant venture 
capital industry is a cornerstone of America’s leadership in the commercialisation of technological innovation. 
A related and widely held belief is that the lack of VC hinders European firms from competing on an equal 
footing (European Commission 1994), although the lack of data has limited the analysis of European VCs 
for a long time. 
The maturation of the VC industry in the US has not been smooth (Gompers 1994). During the 1980s, VC 
firms were in large part publicly funded Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs). While SBICs trained 
many venture capitalists and helped the industry reach a critical mass by channelling large sums to start-
ups, their ability to perform was limited by bureaucratic constraints, lack of professional expertise, a faulty 
design of capital structure and incentives (Lerner 1994a). The big change for VC came in 1979 when the 
relaxation of investment rules for US pension funds led to historically large inflows from these investors.
Until the early 1990s, venture capital remained essentially an American phenomenon. In 1998, the United 
States and then Europe woke up to the Internet and VC started looking also at Europe, opening up London 
offices or establishing joint ventures. In Europe, because of the poor exit alternatives offered by the stock 
markets, funds developed mainly from banks and financial institutions, supported by their own limited 
resources.
The development of the VC industry has experienced periods of boom and bust because it is a highly pro-
cyclical activity. Many funds had been raised, which were invested at the peak of the dot-com boom, and 
quite a few were managed by self-assured people new to VC. After the dot-com bubble burst, in 2000, 
funds stopped making new investments in order to concentrate on their existing portfolios, reduce 
headcounts, and revaluate their investment. 
R&D tends to be more 
reliant on cash-flow in 
the US and the UK with 
their market-based 
financial systems than 
in other developed 
countries.
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Table 1 shows the evolution of VC fund-raising and investment from 1996 to 2007 in the US and in Europe. 
Although fund-raising had increased at a similar pace in the two economies until 2000, when it was about 
five times as large as in 1996, it diverged in 2002, when venture investment came close to a halt in the 
United States, going below its 1995 level. Europe, by contrast, shows more resilience and its investment 
was still substantially higher in 2002 than in 1996.
Table 1.  Funds raised and invested in VC in Europe and the US
Funds raised Funds invested
Europe US Europe US
1996 5,546 9,891 4,009 9,676
1997 9,537 22,360 4,625 14,931
1998 9,432 22,031 6,738 19,190
1999 11,526 25,919 11,390 54,111
2000 24,948 106,181 18,192 100,622
2001 17,940 37,961 10,898 39,030
2002 9,204 3,774 9,236 21,300
2003 8,834 10,641 9,520 19,300
2004 11,335 19,156 15,239 22,100
2005 26,368 28,767 17,297 22,900
2006 14,300 31,925 9,506 20,300
2007 51,017 36,065 48,046 30,600
Source:  EVCA (2007)
Notes:    Data in million of current dollars. The funds raised and invested each year may diverge, since VC firms invest the 
money they raise over a three-to-five-year time span, accumulating resources when good investment opportunities 
are scarce.
Venture capital has become, by now, a sizeable industry also in Europe, as Table 2 shows, and the form of 
financial intermediation most closely associated with dynamic entrepreneurial start-ups, especially in 
high-tech industries like biotechnology, information technology (IT), and e-commerce. Many of today’s 
most dynamic and successful corporations received venture capital at the initial stages of their lives: 
Amazon, Apple, Cisco, e-Bay, Genentech, Genetic Systems, Intel, Microsoft, Netscape, and Sun Microsystems, 
to name just a few. Venture capital also works in more traditional areas; Federal Express, Staples, and 
Starbucks, all received venture financing.
Table 2.    Venture capital in the US and in Europe 









Source:  EVCA (2007) and Eurostat
Venture capital is 
the form of financial 
intermediation most 
closely associated with 
dynamic start-ups in 
high-tech industries.
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4.  Venture capital governance structure 
Venture capitalists are financial intermediaries who organize limited partnerships to finance their 
activity by raising funds from institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies, or 
endowments that are passive limited partners (LPs) (Figure 2). Typically, these funds raise equity at the 
time they are formed, and raise additional capital when investments are made. This additional capital 
usually takes the form of debt when the investment is collateralizable, such as in buyouts, or it may be 
equity from syndication partners, as in a start-up. Gaining a reputation for having produced good 
returns is a key determinant of future successful fund-raising. 














Professional private-equity fund managers, who serve as general partners (GPs), invest each “fund” in 
a number of firms with a five- to ten-year horizon. As long as the basic covenants of the fund agreement 
are followed, LPs do not intervene in the GPs’ investment decisions. Common covenants include 
restrictions on how much fund capital can be invested in a single company, the types of securities a 
fund can invest in, and restrictions on debt at the fund level (as opposed to borrowing at the portfolio 
company level, which is unrestricted). Once a “fund” is ended – by sale to another company, an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO), or recapitalization – its cash proceedings are distributed to investors together 
with any remaining equity holdings. 
Some VC funds are publicly quoted. In this case they do not return capital to investors after realization 
but they pay dividends, as any other public company. In the United Kingdom (Jenkinson 2008), there 
are currently over 100 venture capital trusts (VCTs), which are quoted investment vehicles focussing 
on smaller companies and whose development was encouraged by government providing generous 
tax-relief to individual investors.
The compensation structure of VCs implies LPs paying an annual management fee of 1 to 3 percent 
and a carried interest representing up to 20 percent of the profits of the partnership. Generally, only 
capital gains above a certain annual percentage return, the so-called hurdle rate, are considered for 
the carried-interest calculation.
Venture capitalists are 
financial intermediaries 
who collect funds from 
limited partners and 
invest them in firms with 
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5.  What do venture capitalists do?
Venture capital is a specialized form of financial intermediation. Its success in supporting innovative 
companies, through the provision of finance and expert advice together with stringent incentives to 
perform, has generated much research interest. Venture capitalists’ expertise and their network of 
contacts with potential suppliers and customers (Hochberg et al. 2007) allow entrepreneurs to focus 
on what they are best at: technical development.
VCs concentrate on start-up firms and use their knowledge of industries and markets to evaluate and 
mentor entrepreneurs. The role of venture capital in this context is potentially very important. Their 
strong commitment to generate high returns in the medium term makes them active investors in 
portfolio companies (e.g. Bottazzi et al. 2008; Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Lerner 1995). In particular, 
VCs speed up product commercialization (Hellmann and Puri 2000), the adoption of human-resource 
policies (Hellmann and Puri 2002) and they strengthen companies’ commercialization strategies (Gans 
et al. 2002; Hsu 2006). They can therefore “make the difference” by effectively directing portfolio 
companies’ strategies towards commercial success. VCs also provide ’reputation capital’ (Megginson 
and Weiss 1991) so as to attract top-fly executives or to obtain new contracts.
But venture capitalists are also demanding investors. For instance, they do not provide full financing 
upfront, but disburse money in instalments at different stages of a firm’s development, contingent on 
the achievement of milestones such as a certain amount of sales, or the hiring of key management 
figures. Financing at different stages allows VCs to gather information over time, thus keeping the 
option of abandoning firms whose hopes of success have dwindled. VCs are also found to closely 
oversee investee firms, and to be active board members who step in and take control when times get 
difficult. The combination of the “soft” and “hard” components of VCs’ activity is widely seen to provide 
venture-backed start-ups with an advantage over others firms, since it should increase the chances of 
their survival. 
Some recent analyses of the influence of venture capital on corporate strategy and performance 
provide even stronger evidence that non-financial aspects are crucial to define the activity of VCs. 
Venture investors are “company builders” who influence innovation as much as professionalization 
and commercialization strategies. This view, based on the double-moral-hazard model of VC of 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),3 stresses the active role of venture capitalists as mentors and monitors 
of inexperienced entrepreneurs (Baker and Gompers 2003; Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Lerner 1995). 
There is also another possible, though opposite, view of the role of venture capitalists’. They attract 
companies which already have good growth opportunities (Sørensen 2007), so that venture investors 
would mainly need to bring them to a successful exit. According to this view, venture investors are 
particularly good at timing market conditions (see Gompers et al. 2008). They invest in companies at 
the “right” time with the goal to take them public (or sell them) at the “right” moment (Michelacci and 
Suarez 2004). Therefore, they finance companies whose innovation strategies are already well developed, 
with the perspective of turning them soon into “cash cows” (Bottazzi and Da Rin 2002). Verifying which 
of these two views is closer to reality is important both from a management and from a policy point 
of view.
Finally, venture capitalists also play an important role in the process of going public. Their experience 
helps companies choose the most favourable time for their IPOs and experience lower under-pricing 
(Megginson and Weiss 1991; Lee and Wahal 2003). Venture-backed companies that went public in the 
3  See also Casamatta (2003), Hellmann (2006) and Schmidt (2003).
Venture capitalists also 
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US in the 1970s and 1980s are also found to perform better subsequently than non venture-backed 
companies. VCs shield companies from the need to rush to markets, thus prematurely disclosing 
strategic information to competitors. They also allow firms to wait for the most favourable market 
conditions before going public.
However, whether venture firms affect strategies at the innovation stage remains an open question. 
This is an important question since it goes to the heart of how venture financing might contribute to 
the innovation process. Some studies consider how VC stimulates innovation or start-ups. Kortum and 
Lerner (2002) examine the impact of the provision of VC funds on the rate of patenting for 20 US 
manufacturing industries over a three-decade period and find a 5-18 percent increase in the rate of 
patents caused by venture disbursements.
Recent studies have started examining how VC investors contribute to the formation of cooperative 
alliances for the commercial exploitation of innovations (Gans et al. 2002 and Hsu 2006, using US data), 
and of “explorative” formal R&D alliances (Colombo et al. 2006, using Italian data) 
6.  How do venture capitalists finance companies?
Start-ups rely on the talent and skills of its founder, making it particularly difficult for financiers to 
evaluate performance. In addition, the right to control future strategic decisions is even more important 
in determining success for start-ups than for mature firms. These characteristics of start-ups provide 
good economic reasons for the coexistence of the ’hard’ and ’soft’ sides of venture capital. Unlike in 
standard financial contracting, neither the entrepreneur’s effort nor the venture capitalist’s mentoring 
and monitoring are verifiable by a court, and therefore cannot be contracted upon. A start-up therefore 
creates a situation where both sides have special skills to contribute for which they experience a 
problem of moral hazard. This situation is fundamentally different from that of a bank loan, and in the 
context of start-up finance a standard debt contract simply does not work. One of the first decisions 
in contract negotiations is the type of security issued to the VCs. Separate securities are used for VCs 
and entrepreneurs in order to give VCs different rights. Rights regarding board control and liquidation, 
for example, are tied to the VC’s stock.
Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) find that convertible preferred stock is the most common security, used 
in 204 of the 213 financing rounds existing in their study.4 The “convertible preferred” aspect of the 
stock allows the VC to convert the stock into a common stock if the company does well, and to use the 
stock like a bond if the company does poorly. Even in cases where common stock is used, VCs get a 
different class of common stock with different rights from those of the founders. Similarly, contracts 
allow for different cash flow rights for venture capitalists and founders. Cash flow rights determine 
how the pie will be split between VCs and entrepreneurs once the company goes public, and the split 
is often contingent on performance measures. In the sample contracts, the VC usually controls 
approximately 50 percent of the cash flow rights on average, the founders control 30 percent, and 
others control 20 percent, indicating that founders give up a large fraction of ownership. Liquidation 
cash-flow rights and redemption rights work together to protect the venture capitalist’s investment 
if the company is sold or performs poorly. In nearly all cases, VCs have claims in liquidation that are 
senior to the common stock claims of founders. In 98 percent of the cases, VC claims are at least as 
large as their investment. Board and voting rights allow VCs to have input in decisions on top 
4    Kaplan and Stromberg base their study on a sample of 213 investments in 119 companies by 14 VC firms. Each firm 
provided the contractual agreements governing each financing round in which the firm participated. When available, the 
VC firm also provided the company’s business plan, internal evaluations of the investment, and information on subsequent 
performance.
Moral hazard in the 
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allocation of rights.
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management, corporate strategies and any other action not already specified in the original contract. 
In some cases, provisions are made so that VCs will get full control of the board if the company performs 
poorly. In first venture capital rounds, almost half of the cases allow VCs to have voting majority. 
Kaplan and Stromberg find that VC financings include a number of additional terms and conditions 
beyond the basic rights. For example, VC financings often include automatic-conversion provisions 
under which the security held by the venture capitalist automatically converts into common stock under 
certain conditions. These conditions require that certain financial targets be met, and almost exclusively 
depend on an initial public offering that exceeds a designated common stock price. If the company 
goes public for a high value, the VCs only keep their cash flow rights, ceding the majority of control to 
the entrepreneurs. At some point after VCs give up control, they sell their stock and move on to new 
investments. An automatic-conversion provision is present in 95 percent of the financing rounds. 
Financings that include this provision also require that the stock price of the initial public offering be 
on average three times higher than the stock price of the financing round. The VCs are therefore not 
willing to give up control unless they triple their money. Many contracts also utilize vesting and non-
compete clauses to make it costly for the entrepreneur to leave the firm. Tying the entrepreneur to the 
firm is particularly important in cases where most of the value of the venture lies in the entrepreneur’s 
unique skills. Vesting clauses also give the VCs a way to remove a badly performing Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) without having to keep him or her as a potentially obstructing minority investor down 
the road. The vesting provision requires that the entrepreneur’s shares vest over time, and thus if the 
entrepreneur leaves before the end of the vesting period, they will lose all of their stock.
Most of the contracts contain at least one contingency clause. Additional funding is contingent on 
subsequent performance and actions. Along with financial performance, VCs may also consider such 
indicators as product performance, approvals by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) or patent 
approvals. VCs can and do write contracts with a variety of contingencies, indicating managerial actions 
that the VC is trying to induce or avoid.
7.  The European venture capital industry
How effective is European venture capital in nurturing fast-growing companies? Has the growth in 
the size of the industry corresponded to a growing ability to support the creation of innovative 
companies? The only way to obtain a convincing answer is to turn to firm-level data. In particular, we 
use evidence derived from two datasets that we have gathered and which are to some extent 
complementary: a dataset on VC-backed firms (Bottazzi and Da Rin 2002) and a dataset on European 
VCs for the period 1997-2001 (Bottazzi et al. 2004).
7.1  Evidence on corporate growth
The first dataset tries to infer the effect of VCs on companies that went public on Euro.nm, the alliance 
of Europe’s ’new’ stock markets for innovative companies in high-growth industries, from its inception 
in 1996 to December 2000. The companies’ data are collected from listing prospectuses which contain 
detailed balance sheet information. Such information is not confined to the IPO year, but extends back 
in time, up to the three previous years. We use prospectuses and annual reports to derive quantitative 
information on several financial and business variables. We also collect data for all the available post-
IPO years from annual reports. The final data set consists of 511 companies5 together with data about 
5    Companies in the financial services sector are excluded because their financial structure, funding requirements and strategic 
behaviour differ substantially from those of industrial and (non-financial) services companies (see Bottazzi et al. 2007).
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the financing from VCs and their involvement with these companies. We were able to collect data on 
the extent of ownership and on the timing of VC financing while the exact amount of funding generally 
remains undisclosed. An advantage of looking at Euro.nm listed companies is that they belong to a 
small number of high-tech industries, are of fairly similar age, and come from a small number of 
countries. This makes them a relatively homogeneous group of ’venturable’ companies where we 
naturally find a reliable control sample, avoiding sample design problems. Focusing on Euro.nm listed 
companies also gives an advantage: Companies which make it to the stock market are among the most 
dynamic ones, and therefore we expect VC to be involved with them. Indeed nearly a third of Europe’s 
VCs finance companies listed on Euro.nm. 
Theory predicts VC to be associated with young innovative companies that, being at an early stage of 
development are characterised by low profitability and a small amount of sales. We create a dummy 
that takes a value of one if a company has obtained VC financing and we estimate the probability of 
being VC-backed. To avoid endogeneity the independent variables are measured before the arrival of 
the first venture capitalist. Controlling for sectors and national market effects, we do find that higher 
sales and profitability decrease the probability of obtaining VC financing.6 These findings are consistent 
with the view of venture capital getting involved with firms that are at a very early stage of development 
and not yet able to sell. 
We then turn to look at how VCs affect corporate growth by looking at differences in several key 
variables pre and post-IPO, thereby distinguishing between venture-backed and non venture-backed 
companies. The results are shown in Table 3. The figures are obtained by taking the median over time 
of firm-level observations and then averaging these medians across firms. We investigate whether 
differences between VC-backed and non VC-backed companies are statistically significant. Stars indicate 
significant differences between the two groups of companies within each period (pre- and post-IPO). 
By contrast, bold figures show those values which differ significantly across time within each group 
of companies. 
The table shows that virtually all variables differ across time, with the exception of profitability for 
venture-backed companies and R&D intensity for independent companies. Notably, when we look at 
the data within periods, we see that before the IPO, venture and non venture-backed companies do 
not differ systematically. We find statistically significant differences only in four variables: profitability, 
sales and employment, which are lower for VC-backed companies, and R&D intensity, which is higher. 
After the IPO, non VC-backed firms become significantly bigger in terms of intangible assets, sales 
(which we interpret as a sign of maturity) and capital expenditure. Both types of companies show the 
same level of leverage while the percentage of foreign sales abroad is higher for VC-backed companies. 
We do not find a significant difference between venture-backed companies in terms of post-IPO 
employment or equities. 
Although the analysis of Table 3 is suggestive, it can not be considered conclusive. We need to control 
for the characteristics of the firms in order to ascertain the impact on venture financing on corporate 
growth. We thus turn to a regression analyses (not reported) but the results we obtain are similar. In 
Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) we estimate the determinants of the average growth rate of employment 
and sales in the period up to three years after the IPO.7 VC itself plays no role: if anything, it brings 
about a decrease in the employment growth, which is however statistically insignificant. By contrast, 
6  By contrast, being a French firm or a firm in the biomedical sector increases the probability of VC backing.
7    The model we have in mind is very simple: the capacity of an innovative firm to grow is a function of its ability to invest, 
which can be financed either from revenues or from external finance (debt or equity). Age is an indicator of the stage of 
corporate development and is also relevant because we expect younger companies to grow faster.
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leverage, age and country are relevant explanatory variables. For example, German companies have 
a 31 percent higher employment growth rate. 
Table 3.  The effects of venture financing: VC-backed and non VC-backed companies before and 
after going public
Company indicator  Venture capital 
involvement 
Pre-IPO Post-IPO
Assets non-VC-backed 14.3 55.3*
VC-backed 10.7 45.5*
Debt  non-VC-backed 4.3 16.6*
VC-backed 3.8 11.4*
Equity  non-VC-backed 1.7 34.9
VC-backed 1.4 28.1
EBITDA non-VC-backed 1.1* 2.4
VC-backed 0.2* 0.7
Leverage non-VC-backed 0.8 0.33
VC-backed 0.8 0.31
ROA non-VC-backed 0.13* 0.05*
VC-backed 0.05* 0.02*
Sales non-VC-backed 13.2* 33.5*
VC-backed 9.8* 21.9*
Employees non-VC-backed 85* 210
VC-backed 62* 175
Capital expenditure non-VC-backed 0.7 6.8*
VC-backed 0.5 4.8*
Foreign sales (percent) non-VC-backed 0.27 0.02*
VC-backed 0.35 0.19*
Intangible assets non-VC-backed 0.21 7.7*
VC-backed 0.24 3.6*
R&D intensity  non-VC-backed 0.07* 0.09
VC-backed 0.13* 0.11
Source:  Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002)
Notes:    Variables are in levels. For each variable we report the average values of the medians for the (up to) three years 
before the IPO or after the IPO, separately for non-venture-backed and for venture-backed companies. Bold figures 
indicate statistically significant differences across time (5-percent significance level) as diagnosed by a Wilcoxon 
test. Stars (*) indicate statistically significant differences between VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies within 
a given time period (5-percent significance level, using Kruskal-Wallis sign-rank test). Financial data are in millions of 
euro. Debt is the sum of book value of short and long-term liabilities. Equity is total shareholders’ equity. Leverage 
is debt over debt plus equity. Capital expenditure equals investment in property, plants and equipment. ROA is 
return on assets computed as operating margin over assets, and operating margin equals EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization), an accounting measure of profitability. R&D intensity equals R&D 
expenditure over sales. 
When we restrict our sample to the more innovative (i.e. R&D-performing) companies, we finally find 
that VC does play a role: venture-backed companies decrease their sales after the IPO. Age and leverage 
retain their negative effect on sales, while profitability and country become insignificant. All in all, the 
results show that VC-backed firms are not the “superstars” among those listed on the New Markets. 
All in all, European 
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VOL_2_02_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_2_BOTAZZI.indd   41 23/12/09   14:16:2742            Volume14  N°2   2009           EIB  PAPERS
Finally, we look at two other dimensions on which VCs might play a role: the time to listing (TTL) – 
defined as the period of time between the birth of the firm and the IPO – and the amount of capital 
raised at IPO. VC turns out to have little effect on the TTL of European companies listed on the “New 
Markets” but it has a positive and significant effect on the amount raised at IPO. By contrast, for the 
US the National Venture Capital Association claims US venture-backed companies were 70 percent 
more likely to become listed than other start-ups that within the same period of time (NVCA 1998). 
We interpret these findings as suggesting that the role of VC in Europe is somewhat different from that 
in the United States. The provision of early-stage financing, which has grown very fast in the past three 
years, seems to be crucial to allow innovative start-ups to overcome credit constraints, which are 
arguably tighter on the old continent. These companies then go public to raise capital, invest, and 
grow, consistently with the relaxation of credit constraints via the IPO. But we cannot say at this stage 
whether the lack of a systematic association with the most successful innovative companies is due to 
the immaturity of European VC or to a lack of “superstars” among young European firms.8
7.2  Evidence on venture capitalists in Europe
A tentative answer to the question left open in the previous sub-section can be found by looking at 
our second dataset which helps understand the peculiarity of the European VC industry. Through a 
questionnaire sent to 780 VCs firms in the 15 EU countries, Switzerland and Norway, we have obtained 
information on more than 150 funds, 480 GPs, 600 LPs (investors), and 1,300 portfolio companies in 
Europe. This information is relative to funds raised and investments made between January 1998 and 
December 2001, and to the partners active at the end of that year focussing on the pure VC financing, 
excluding firms which operate solely in leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) and management buy-outs (MBOs).9 
Not surprisingly, the big three European private equity markets – France, Germany, and the U.K. – show 
the largest number of firms financed. 
Our sample is quite representative of the entire population of European venture firms. As Table 4 shows, 
the respondents are fairly evenly distributed among countries with most national response rates close 
to the overall rate of 15 percent.
Information gathered shows that venture capitalists’ partners range widely in age, but most of them 
with an average work experience as VCs of seven years, ranging from zero to 32 years. There is a large 
share of partners with less than five years of experience which indicates that nearly half of them must 
come from other occupations; nearly half of all partners have professional experience in the financial 
sector, and about 40 percent have professional experience in the corporate sector.
8    A sensible objection to our interpretation is that, since all companies listed on Euro.nm received a high valuation, the true 
value of being venture-backed had been masked. 
9    We contacted only those venture firms which, in 2001, (i) were members of the European Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA) or of a national VC organization, (ii) were actively engaged in VC and (iii) were still in operation in 2002. We thus 
deliberately excluded pure MBO management buy-out firms. The overall response rate was 15 percent. We received 118 
responses with various degrees of completeness. We then spent considerable time augmenting the data with information 
from a variety of sources, such as the websites of the respondents and commercially available databases like Amadeus or 
Zephyr.
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Table 4.  Country composition and response rate
Population Sample Response Rate (percent)
Austria 23 8 34.8
Belgium 34 4 11.8
Denmark 29 4 13.8
Finland 33 6 18.2
France 101 14 13.9
Germany 146 19 13.0
Greece 8 4 50.0
Ireland 15 3 20.0
Italy 37 5 13.5
Luxembourg 3 1 33.3
The Netherlands 52 4 7.7
Norway 22 2 9.1
Portugal 10 2 20.0
Spain 38 10 26.3
Sweden 17 6 35.3
Switzerland 43 6 14.0
UK 139 21 15.1
Total 750 119 15.8
Source:  Bottazzi et al. (2004)
Another intriguing finding concerns the educational attainment of European venture capitalists. More 
than three-quarters of venture capitalists have a graduate degree. Business degree is common. Graduate 
scientific education, while less common, is far from negligible: 11 percent have a Master in engineering 
or sciences, and over 16 percent a Ph.D. Most of the Ph.D.s are in natural sciences. It is surprising that 
less than a third have an engineering or science education. However, we have seen that a scientific 
background is most popular among Ph.D.s. This suggests that while relatively few in number, partners 
educated in science have a strong background.
Although VC is considered a local phenomenon we note that a significant number of VC firms have 
secondary offices: one out of four opened a secondary office, most of them in France and in the U.K. 
It also shows the countries where these are located. Within Europe, the Netherlands and Germany 
registered the most secondary offices. We also find a considerable amount of cross-border integration 
at the partnership level. Overall, nearly a quarter of all partners come from another country, suggesting 
that the largest markets for venture capital are “exporting” venture expertise.
Surprisingly, the data show a high level of cross-border investments. We find 314 foreign venture deals 
in our survey, which constitutes nearly a quarter of our sample investments. The most active cross-
border investors are Germany, Switzerland and the U.K. Within Europe, the U.K. and France attracts 
the most foreign investments.
Overall, our data show a surprisingly high integration of the European VC industry at all levels. This 
changes the common perception of VC as a purely local business and of European VCs limiting 
themselves to investing in the domestic economy. Naturally, the US also has an influence on the 
There is considerable 
cross-border integration 
at the partnership level 
and a high level of cross-
border investment.
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European VC market. While we find that only 8 percent of all European venture capitalists are originally 
from the US, 34 percent of all European partners have some work experience in the US. Yet the number 
of partners with specific VC experience in the US is lower, at about 7 percent.
A last word is about the investors in VC firms. We look into the types of investor which supply these 
funds. Table 5 provides a detailed breakdown of these investors. The table shows the average percentage 
of funds held by each investor type and the percentage of funds that have at least one investor of each 
type. Bank and institutional investors are the investors which are present in most funds, while corporate 
venture capitalists invest very selectively. Public investors, who are present in relatively few funds, 
typically provide a majority of the capital, while corporate investors invest the smallest share. These 
data thus suggest that different investor types behave quite differently.
Table 5.  Investor types
Investor type Average holding of investor 
(percent)
Percent of funds in which this investor 
type is present (percent)
Bank investors 40  44 
Corporate investors 25  23 
Financial investors 30 31 
Institutional investors 44  40 
Public investors 53 28 
Individual investors 45  24 
Source:  Bottazzi et al. (2004)
Note:  Average holding of investor is the average percentage of funds held by each type of investor.
7.3  Education, experience and venture capitalists’ activism 
Compared with their US colleagues, European venture capitalists have the reputation of being 
conservative and non-interfering (“hands-off”). Our dataset points to the presence of an increasing 
variety of investment styles across the continent. Sixty percent of all deals are seed or early-stage 
investments, indicating a healthy level of risk tolerance. In terms of getting involved with their companies, 
68 percent of venture capitalists sit on the board of directors, 69 percent monitor their company on a 
monthly or weekly basis, and 42 percent help to recruit key managers for their investment companies. 
The industry is undergoing changes: new entrant firms invest more at the seed stage and monitor 
their investments more closely. Interestingly, partners in new entrant firms have more prior professional 
experience and are more likely to have a business education and a Master’s degree. All of these 
characteristics help to explain why the new entrant firms adopt investment styles that more closely 
resemble those of US VC firms.
A unique feature of the European market is that a significant number of venture capital firms are owned 
and managed by banks and corporations. Corporate VC firms, which may also have strategic objectives 
(Hellmann 2002), invest more in early-stage companies. Partners in these firms have relatively less VC 
experience although they are more likely to have Master’s degrees and/or a science education. By 
contrast, partners in bank-owned VC firms are more likely to have a business education. Most strikingly, 
bank VC firms also invest much less in early-stage deals and are less likely to monitor their firms 
frequently or to sit on the board of directors.
Some types of investors 
are more widely 
represented across 
funds than others, and 
the share held in each 
fund also differs across 
investor types.
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One possible question is whether these investor characteristics influence investor activism and whether 
an active investment style matters for the success of portfolio companies. In Bottazzi et al. (2008) we have 
examined how human capital and organizational characteristics affect the activity level of VC firms by 
distinguishing between three types of human capital effects: (i) the accumulation of job-specific knowledge 
enabling VCs to become better over time at providing services (measured by a partner’s years of experience 
as a venture capitalist); (ii) the partner’s knowledge of what it takes to create and run a company (measured 
by a partner’s earlier business experience); and (iii) the partner’s formal knowledge (measured by a partner’s 
scientific education). For each of these measures, we construct the average human capital profile of the 
venture firm. This allows us to examine what kind of human capital is conducive to an active investment 
style. In terms of organizational structure, we emphasize the distinction between private, independent VC 
firms and so-called captive firms, which are affiliated with corporations, banks or the government.
Our first central finding is that human capital and organizational structure are significantly related to 
investor activism. Venture firms whose partners have prior business experience are significantly more 
active in the companies they finance. Interestingly, the partner’s VC experience itself does not have a 
significant effect on this, and science education has only little effect. In terms of organizational structure, 
we find that private independent VC firms are significantly more involved with their portfolio companies 
than captive firms.
Information about different partner roles inside VC firms allows us to examine the allocation of tasks within 
venture firms. We find that having more venture experience or business experience increases the likelihood 
that a partner is put in charge of supervising portfolio companies. Within VC firms, greater venture experience 
has a positive and significant effect on the level of activism.
The next important step is to examine whether these activities affect performance. We are faced with two 
main challenges: measurement and identification. Concerning the first, ideally one would like to measure 
investor returns but VC returns are not publicly available. We therefore follow the extant literature and 
adopt an approach similar to Gompers et al. (2008) and Sørensen (2007) of measuring performance by 
whether the invested companies experience a successful exit, defined either as an IPO or an acquisition.
We examine the influence of investor activism on exits, controlling for a possible endogeneity effect, since 
investors might be more active with companies that are facing performance challenges. We find that a 
positive relationship exists between investor activism and exit performance, and that this relationship is 
both statistically and economically significant.
These results provide some important answers to the question about what makes venture capital firms 
effective investors. The strongest predictor of whether a VC firm adopts an active investment style is 
whether the partners have prior industry experience. Moreover, activism seems to improve performance. 
These findings are interesting since in many countries venture capitalists have more financial than industry 
backgrounds. However, one should not simply conclude that hiring partners with prior industry experience 
will always increase activism and improve performance.
Our study is not the only one that analyses the effect of experience on VC. In a concurrent research project, 
Gompers et al. (2008) examine the role of experience on the investment behaviour of VC firms. They provide 
evidence that prior deal flow experience helps VC firms to take advantage of deal opportunities by ramping 
up investments when opportunities improve, and that ramp-up often leads to a better exit 
performance.10 
10    Gompers et al. use US data from Thompson VentureXpert. This has the advantage of providing a long history of VC deals, 
but also the disadvantage of containing little deal-specific information while in our study we can build direct measures of 
VCs’ human capital.
Experienced partners 
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7.4  Which companies do European venture capitalists finance?
Contrary to a common perception, and differently from the US, the European venture capital industry 
did not invest only in fashionable Internet projects. In fact, the industry is surprisingly well diversified 
across several high-technology industries, with the majority of companies receiving only a single round 
of financing over the sample period.11
Traditionally, it has been argued that European VC favours already existing firms with a track record. 
But the contrary holds since venture financing at early stages, which typically requires relatively small 
sums, is becoming more common in Europe: more than half of the financing rounds are at the seed or 
start-up stage.
Another myth we can debunk is that European venture capitalists do not know how to cooperate. 
Instead we find that almost half of all deals are syndicated. In fact, more than 75 percent of our venture 
firms took part in a syndicated deal, and about half took on the role of lead at least once.
An interesting question regards the dynamic evolution of VCs’ characteristics as Europe has experienced 
new entrants in the industry. While partners of new entrants are not younger than the older ones, they 
differ in other respects such as educational background: they show a higher proportion of Master’s 
degrees and greater emphasis on business education. Also, their overall educational attainment is 
higher than for the incumbents.
By contrast, analysis of professional backgrounds reveals milder differences. Partners in the younger 
firms tend to have only slightly more of a consulting, and less of a finance background than their 
incumbent colleagues.
An intriguing result of our study is that over and above being different from incumbents, new entrants 
also specialize in different sectors, emphasizing software and Internet deals. Both partners’ backgrounds 
and investment patterns are consistent with the notion that the VC boom of the late nineties was 
largely driven by business opportunities (in particular the Internet) rather than more technological 
opportunities. Note, however, that the difference with the old guard is not enormous, mainly because 
the old guard itself invested heavily in that sector and remains strongest in the biotechnology and 
medical sectors.
Interestingly, new entrants focus much more on investing in early-stage companies, especially at the 
seed stage, and tend to be more closely involved with their companies, in terms of a higher monitoring 
intensity: they are 10 percent more likely to monitor their companies intensively.
Overall we see that the new entrants have adopted an investment style that by and large can be 
characterized as more risk-tolerant and more hands-on than the older generation of European VC 
firms.
7.5  The degree of contractual sophistication
Our dataset allows us to study the degree of contractual sophistication of European VCs and to study 
whether the marked differences which exist across countries in legal and tax environments influence 
the appeal of different financial instruments.
11  This is likely to be due to the relatively short time horizon covered in the data.
The European venture 
capital industry is  
well-diversified.
VOL_2_02_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_2_BOTAZZI.indd   46 23/12/09   14:16:28EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°2   2009            47
We define four broad classes of financial instruments: pure debt, convertible debt, pure equity, and 
preferred equity. The result is that pure equity is the true workhorse of European VC but European 
venture capitalists are certainly no strangers to more sophisticated contracts such as preferred equity 
or convertible debt or contingent clauses in their contracts. A contingent clause specifies the 
circumstances under which a venture capitalist can take certain actions such as liquidating the company, 
taking control of the board, or firing the CEO. We find that the right to force a trade sale is used in more 
than half of the cases. Other contingent clauses are less common but they are typically used in at least 
a third of the deals. On average, each deal entails the use of more than two contingent clauses and 
more than two-thirds of the deals make use of at least one contingent clause.
In addition to crafting financial deals, VCs can play an important role in terms of monitoring and 
supporting their companies. More than a third of VCs state that they visit their portfolio companies at 
least monthly, reflecting an active attitude regarding the management. Moreover, for 66 percent of 
companies we find that VCs monitor them by taking a board seat, thus contributing directly to honing 
strategies.
In Bottazzi et al. (2009), we examine how optimal contracts, and the resulting investor behaviour, 
depend on the legal system. We propose a simple theory that makes three predictions. First, the better 
the legal system the more investors provide value-adding support. The underlying intuition is that 
investing in support activities is only worthwhile if the legal system provides investors with sufficient 
guarantees that these efforts will not be wasted. Second, the better the legal system, the higher is 
investors’ demand for contractual downside protection using securities such as debt, convertible debt 
or preferred equity. The main intuition is that in a better legal system it is optimal to give the entrepreneur 
stronger upside incentives. In order to satisfy their participation constraint, investors thus require 
additional cash flow rights on the downside. Third, we consider the influence of the legal system on 
intermediaries’ incentives to develop the competencies necessary to provide value-adding services, 
predicting that intermediaries from countries with a better legal system will provide more value-adding 
services, even when investing abroad. 
We find clear empirical support for our theoretical predictions. Better legal systems are associated 
with more investor involvement and more downside protection for the investors. The results hold for 
legal origin, using the standard interpretation that the Anglo-Saxon common law system is better for 
investors than systems based on civil law. They also hold for two widely used index measures of the 
quality of the legal system: the rule of law and the degree of legal procedural complexity.12
Furthermore, the data allow us to examine whether the effects of legal systems come through the 
company or the investor, an issue that has not yet been fully answered in the earlier literature. We 
introduce a novel empirical approach of determining the relative importance of company and investor 
legal-system effects comparing two sets of regressions: one with company legal-system variables and 
investor country fixed effects, the other with investor legal system variables and company country 
fixed effects. 
We find robust investor legal-system effects, that is, such effects are present whether our equations 
do or do not control for company country fixed effects. However, company legal-system effects are 
not robust: they cease to be found when the analysis takes into account investor country fixed effects. 
12    Legal scholars classify national legal systems according to the legal origins of the commercial code: legal systems with 
common-law origin and legal systems with civil-law origin. The rule of law index  measures the quality of legal enforcement 
while the index of procedural complexity measures the degree of legal formalism by averaging the cost, length of time 
and number of steps necessary to perform two simple legal operations, like recovering a bounced check and evicting a 
tenant.
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These results are consistent with the theoretical model prediction that investors from countries with 
stronger legal protection provide more support and demand more downside protection. They suggest 
that the legal system affects financial transactions not only directly, but also indirectly by affecting 
the practices adopted by financial intermediaries. In particular, they point to the importance of 
considering the relationship between investor and entrepreneur in its entirety, accounting both for 
contractual and non-contractual aspects. Moreover, the analysis shows how the legal system affects 
not only contracts, but also investors’ actions and their investment styles. These findings also have 
implications for our understanding of cross country differences.
7.6  Do different types of venture capital firms behave differently?
The last question we ask is whether different types of venture capitalists – independent, bank, public 
and corporate VC firms – behave differently. 
There is a debate about whether we should expect each of these firm types to invest differently. For 
instance, one may ask whether banks are well positioned to take a leadership role in the origination 
of early-stage venture deals, or whether a strategic motivation precludes corporate investors from 
investing in lower-technology companies. 
The results are interesting. First, in terms of age and experience of partners across the four different 
types of venture firms, independent VCs have twice as much experience as corporate or public VCs. 
Regarding education, while the percentage of partners with a Master’s degree is particularly high 
among corporate VCs, who also have the highest percentage of partners with a graduate degree, 
public VCs show distinctly lower average educational attainment. Independent and corporate VCs are 
very similar in this respect, preferring people with an engineering or science education. By contrast, 
bank VCs show a particularly strong preference for people with a business education and public VCs 
for those with a background in humanities or social sciences. Strikingly, no partner of a public VC firm 
has a science background.
Not only do different types of venture capital firms hire different kinds of partners, they also make 
different types of investments. We see that public venture capitalists stayed away from software and 
Internet investments. Unlike other venture firms, they also concentrated most of their investments on 
industrial products, biotech and the media. They are, therefore, much less diversified, as a category, 
than the others. Interestingly, corporate investors chose to stick to their industrial expertise, contributing 
a large share of investments in medical products and industrial services, while investing relatively little 
in software, the Internet and the media. Bank-backed venture firms were the most aggressive investors 
in Internet deals as well as in industrial products.
Different types of VC firms also emphasize different stages of investment. Independent and corporate 
VCs are similar in their focus on earlier investment stages, which is definitely more pronounced than 
that of bank or public venture firms. The commitment to monitor or take a board seat is also quite 
different across types of venture firms. We say that VCs have a high monitoring intensity if they personally 
interact with a company at least on a monthly basis. Independent VCs have the highest monitoring 
intensity, closely followed by corporate investors. Once again, bank and public VCs behave differently 
and interact less frequently with the firms they invest in.
Overall, we find considerable differences in the investment styles between independent, public, 
corporate, and bank venture capitalists. 
Independent, corporate, 
public and Bank VC 
firms differ with respect 
to partner profiles, 
sector of activity and 
investment stage.
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8.  Conclusions
Does venture capital alleviate financial constraints of innovative firms? Preliminary analyses of the role 
of venture capitalists in Europe shows that, in the period 1997-2000, VC is not associated with particularly 
dynamic or successful companies, whether we look at sales growth or employment. This result clashes 
with the evidence of the role of VC on US companies. 
Yet, VC is not only about money. It is also about steering and supporting portfolio companies. This is 
done in a number of ways which differ depending on VCs’ educational and organizational background 
as well as on the legal and cultural environment in which they operate. 
Human capital is a key driver of the investment activities of venture capital firms since it affects the 
level of activism of VCs and, ultimately, the success of portfolio companies. Improving the availability 
of postgraduate education, including executive education or other professional training, is likely to 
have a very positive effect on the level of professionalism in the industry. Interestingly, Europe has 
experienced new entrants in the industry during the tech-bubble 1999-2000. Overall we see that 
Europe’s new entrants to the VC industry have adopted an investment style that, by and large, can be 
characterized as more risk-tolerant and more hands-on than that of the older generation of VC firms, 
closer to the US investment style.
Cross-country activity within Europe – and across the Atlantic – shows promising signs of an integrating 
market. European venture capitalists clearly consider it important to be able to invest outside their 
own country. Simplifications of tax rules and cross-border investment regulations are likely to have a 
strong beneficial impact on the integration of the European VC industry.
Finally, the data document a wide variety of behaviours by different types of venture firms. It is important 
to encourage healthy competition among these different approaches to venture financing. Reducing 
red tape and increasing limited partners’ ability to invest in all types of venture firms, as well as across 
borders, are likely to serve this purpose.
More generally, as other researchers have suggested, the greatest assistance to venture capital may 
be provided by government programs that seek to enhance the demand for these funds rather than 
the supply of capital. 
Lower regulatory 
barriers and simpler tax 
rules would foster the 
internationalization of 
VC and the demand for 
VC funds.
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Global  policy  discussions  increasingly  focus  on 
innovation and the knowledge economy as a driver of 
long-term growth. In parallel new forms of innovation 
processes  are  emerging,  notably  open  innovation 
and  innovation  networks  stressing  the  importance 
of connections between various stakeholders. Links 
between  universities  and  the  business  sector  are  of 
particular importance as many inventions come out 
of  universities  but  have  to  be  further  developed 
to  become  economically  relevant  innovations. 
New  financing  instruments  and  attracting  private 
investors to technology transfer (TT) are necessary but 
difficult as the pattern of risk and information in this 
‘in-between area’ is complex: Technology is not basic 
anymore and it requires large amounts of capital to 
be scaled up – with uncertain market prospects. This 
paper  addresses  new  financial  instruments  for  TT, 
building on European Investment Fund’s experience 
in this field.  




1.  Innovation and the Knowledge Economy
1.1  Where is Lisbon?
According to the European Commission, “Europe’s research and industrial base suffers from a series 
of weaknesses. The greatest perceived weakness, however, is Europe’s comparatively limited capacity 
to convert scientific breakthroughs and technological achievements into industrial and commercial 
successes” (e.g. European Commission 1994). This assessment has served as major catalyst for making 
innovation policy a strategic priority for the EC. In its broad-based innovation strategy for the EU, the 
importance of improving knowledge transfer between public research institutions and third parties, 
including industry, has been identified by the EC as one of the key areas for action (European Commission 
2007b) and reiterated in its recent review of the EU innovation policy (European Commission 2009).
There is the well-known Lisbon-objective that the EU shall become in 2010 “the most competitive 
knowledge-based economy of the world” (Lisbon Summit 2000) with expenditures of 3 percent of 
GDP for R&D. However, with only a few months left in 2009 and despite increased financial efforts and 
structural reforms implemented in several countries during the past years, Europe has not significantly 
improved its competitive position (Guellec and Sachwald 2008). Europe will not be able to meet the 
target in 2010, so what is necessary to improve the situation in the future?
Strengthening EU invention capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition as already stressed by 
Schumpeter (1951) “Economic leadership must be distinguished from invention. As long as they are 
not carried out into practice, inventions are economically irrelevant”. Future growth will be determined 
by the Schumpeterian entrepreneur being able to transform the invention and new knowledge into 
practice through innovation. In this context, the term “marriage of new knowledge with its successful 
introduction into the marketplace” is often used (e.g. Baumol et al. 2007, p. 5). 
1.2  Innovation is key
Hence, stronger innovation is the key element. The Oslo manual (OECD, Eurostat 2005) defines Innovation 
as “the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new 
marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or 
external relation. The minimum requirement for an innovation is that the product, process, marketing 
method or organisational method must be new (or significantly improved) to the firm”.1 It is – to say 
it with Peter Drucker’s words – the change that creates a new dimension of performance. 
The sources and conditions for innovation are variegated. Many innovations, notably non-technological 
ones (marketing, organisation, distribution etc.) come directly from the effort of firms and specialised 
in-house departments implementing their own ingenuity. However, many other innovations proceed 
from inventions, often based on R&D performed by high-tech firms or universities. They are more 
intensive in scientific knowledge, they are often more radical or disruptive (transformative of market 
conditions). This demonstrates the importance of a high-quality, vibrant university sector which 
performs the best basic research. 
1  Source: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/glossary/index_en.htm
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The issue in those cases is how to bring the invention from the lab to the market, gathering both the 
funding and the knowledge transfer which are required. This is all the less trivial when the invention 
is made in a university (as opposed to a corporate) laboratory, which usually does not have the skills 
and incentives to transform the invention into an innovation. The two issues, raising capital and 
transferring knowledge, cannot be addressed separately: designing the right incentives and sharing 
risk optimally between the parties requires the two aspects to be solved simultaneously, using then 
appropriate intellectual-property (IP) and financial instruments. This is the focus of the rest of this 
paper. 
1.3  Small is beautiful – but so is large
Innovation is important for SMEs and corporates – and SMEs and corporates are essential for innovation. 
Empirical studies show that innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) grow faster and 
create more jobs than non-innovative SMEs. They are the so-called Gazelles. Empirical studies (see e.g. 
KfW 2006) show as well that innovative start-ups (where the creation of the start-up was based on an 
innovation) create more new jobs than non-innovative start-ups. However, policy measures should 
not only focus on SMEs. The share of innovative SMEs increases gradually with the size of the companies. 
As early as 1942, Schumpeter describes the innovative power of bigger enterprises – they have the 
necessary resources to finance substantial R&D project. These ideas have also been discussed by 
Galbraith (1952) and Arrow (1962). Policy measures should recognise that large firms are essential for 
the innovation system. The recent trend of concentrating resources on SMEs ignores the natural ecology 
of industry. An often neglected target group is the medium-sized firm above the SME threshold. This 
category probably has the greatest potential for increasing R&D spending but has also been struggling 
to do so in recent years (Aho 2006).
The contribution of small and medium-sized innovative firms is also key for large firms: many of the 
smaller firms are acquired at some stage by large ones, which use them as a source of radical innovations 
that the more closed and stratified context of large firms does not facilitate. At the same time, access 
to the funding, manufacturing and distribution capacities of a large firm allows in many cases to 
leverage the innovative performance of small firms. In the information technology or biotechnology 
sectors this dynamic has been essential to industrial development.
The reasons why Europe is currently not able to meet the Lisbon goals have been discussed extensively 
in various reports (see e.g. Guellec and Sachwald 2008; Aho 2006). The connection between academia, 
which generates new inventions, and the business sector, which can transform them into innovations 
is too weak. Innovative businesses face difficulties to access capital and markets; reasons are risks, 
external benefits associated to R&D programmes, and the cost structure (high fixed costs, low marginal 
costs). Hence the need for new financial instruments as part of public policies to boost technology 
transfers between universities and businesses and to ease the setting-up of new businesses exploiting 
university inventions.
1.4  Knowledge exploitation
Knowledge creation and diffusion are more and more integrated into the notion of open innovation 
(see OECD 2008), corresponding to the increased organisation of innovative activities across firm 
boundaries to optimise the use of internal and external sources of innovation. The sourcing of external 
knowledge and the commercialisation of in-house innovations leads to the emergence of new networks 
to share and exchange knowledge. In turn, the development of innovation networks helps create new 
markets for ideas and technologies to facilitate the exchange of Intellectual Property (IP) between 
parties, the signing of research contracts or the creation of spin-outs. New forms of knowledge 
Innovative SMEs grow 
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exploitation and the creation of technology markets require the design of appropriate financial 
instruments to support the circulation and commercialisation of knowledge.
Such an evolution should be connected to Europe’s own ability to turn new ideas and inventions into 
products and services responding to client needs. In addition, the European technological landscape 
is still mainly supply-side oriented partially due to the lack of adequate matching interfaces between 
the supply and demand for scientific knowledge.
Dissemination of created knowledge and commercialisation of IP rights are closely connected to the 
different phases of growth of technology start-ups. They broadly evolve through the following phases 
of development from downstream to upstream investment:
“Technology transfer” phase: from invention and IP generation to business concept, proof-of- •	
concept phase and first customers;
“Venture” phase: developing a product line, broadening the customer base and establishing a  •	
full-fledged business;
“Expansion” phase: Once the business opportunity is proven, the business needs to expand,  •	
distribution channels need to be set up, marketing efforts need to be developed and large-scale 
production capabilities need to be put in place.
Across Europe, it is often the first and third phases that are most difficult to finance.2
2.  Converting research into products
Technology transfer (TT) can be broadly defined as the process of converting scientific findings from 
research organisations into useful products by the commercial sector. TT is also known as “knowledge 
transfer or knowledge sharing”. This is the process whereby an enterprise converts scientific findings 
from research laboratories and universities into products and services in the marketplace.3 TT can take 
three main channels (Figure 1):
The creation of new companies (spin-outs), which often involves some transfer of personnel  •	
(mobility of researchers);
Collaboration between universities, research organisations and industry notably via research  •	
contracts; and/or
Licensing of IP. •	
TT presents specific features discussed in this paper. Many such features are also found in other areas 
of “upstream investing” (Business Angels, Clusters, pre-seed, seed investments).
2    Other related market segments like pre-seed and seed investments, Business Angel investing and clusters/incubators face 
similar challenges.
3    See also: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/finance/index_en.htm.
There is a lack of 
matching interfaces 
between supply and 
demand of scientific 
knowledge in Europe.
VOL_2_03_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_2_DARCY.indd   57 23/12/09   14:16:4358            Volume14  N°2   2009           EIB  PAPERS
Figure 1.  The idea of TT from universities/research centres to the market














Source:   EIF
Figure 2 below summarises the SME life cycle and the related financing needs. TT is to be seen on the 
left hand side of the graph. But this only captures technology transfer incompletely. TT or the 
commercialisation of research also takes many other forms than the SME life cycle (licensing, corporate 
venture etc.). Box 1 provides a more elaborate presentation of the importance of licensing.
Figure 2.  Positioning of TT in the company/spin-off market segment
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Technology transfer 
is most relevant in 
the early stages of an 
innovative company’s 
life-cycle.
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Box 1.  Exploiting patents through licensing1
Various types of licensing are practiced, including unilateral licensing, cross-licensing and patent 
pools, all of which involve an agreement by the owner of a patent (licensor) to allow another 
party (licensee) to make, sell and use the patented invention on an exclusive or non-exclusive 
basis, without transferring ownership of the patent. Usually, a licensor receives financial rewards 
in exchange for the licence, typically in the form of royalty payments. Licensing is therefore one 
suitable mechanism for transferring technology between licensors who want to leverage their 
technological assets and licensees who want to complement their internal technological 
capabilities. The advantages and disadvantages of licensing can vary from one case to another. 
In some cases, a patent licence itself is not sufficient to enable a licensee to bring a new product 
or service to the market because additional know-how is needed, in the form of documentation, 
software, samples, training and consulting services. 
Table B1.  Advantages and disadvantages of patent licensing
Inward-licensing
Advantages Licence payments tend to be less costly than in-house R&D •	
Payment can be used to control risks by prudent design of payment scheme •	
Shortens the time required for R&D and bringing new products into markets •	
Lower risks when an invention has already been commercialised •	
Disadvantages Some restrictions in licensing agreements may raise antitrust concerns •	
Outward-licensing
Advantages High profitability, although revenue streams are uncertain •	
Allows multiple licensees at the same time •	
Less risky than Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) •	
Simplicity if licensee does not need technical advice (only contract drafting   •	
needed)
Especially for SMEs, lowers risk by eliminating need for downstream  •	
production facilities
Disadvantages Potentially creates rivals in downstream markets who could erode future  •	
profits
Total profit is usually smaller than with successful internal development •	
Returns depend on capability of licensees to develop and market the  •	
invention
Source:   Kamiyama et al. (2006)
As will be explained in Section 3, the size and evolution of technology licensing markets is difficult 
to measure. Accounting rules do not require firms to disclose patent licensing revenues as a 
separate item in corporate reports, and although most OECD countries have regulatory 
requirements for reporting licensing contracts, these are mostly related to cross-border 
transactions, and data are published only at an aggregate level. As a result, disclosure of patent 
licensing activity depends largely on firm policy. Even though disclosure of information on 
1   This box is based on Kamiyama et al. (2006).
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Technology transfer often involves a formal transfer of rights to use and commercialise new discoveries 
and innovations resulting from scientific research to another party. The TT process also covers funded 
research, innovation disclosure, patents, licensing and sometimes new start-up ventures. Returns on 
TT are primarily in the form of licensing royalties, but also include sponsored research, one-off 
transactional fees and new venture equity. Figure 3 summarises the TT process from the securing of 
funding to the generation of TT returns, considering the core functions of a technology transfer office 
(TTO).
The TT “funding gap” describes a situation in the life-cycle of a start-up/project whereby typical sources 
of early-stage funding dry up while late-stage sources of funding are not yet available. The TT “funding 
gap” thus generates a disconnection between early basic research and downstream development. 
Typically basic research and early target discovery are mainly funded by government grants (sometimes 
also through philanthropic research funds). Once a technology has reached the proof-of-concept stage, 
in late preclinical testing in the case of biotech for instance, venture capital (VC) and licensing funds 
become available and are supplemented by private equity, public offerings and late stage licensing 
When early-stage 
funds dry up and late-
stage funds are not yet 
available, companies 
face a funding gap.
licensing revenues has been shown to have a positive effect on investors, most firms choose not 
to make such information public. Hence, available data on patent licensing is limited, scattered, 
and lacking in uniformity in spite of demand for more systematic data by policy makers, investors 
and academics. 
One of the most direct benefits of patent licensing is generating revenue for the patent holder. 
In recent years, a number of firms have been able to generate considerable royalties from outward 
licensing of technology. IBM Corp., which started to more actively manage its IP rights in the late 
1990s and obtained more than 3,000 US patent grants per year on average between 2000 and 
2004, received more than USD 1 billion in annual revenues from licensing royalties and sales of 
IP rights; about half of these revenues came from licensing. Other technology-intensive firms 
also report significant amounts from patent licensing.
Licensing appears to be concentrated in high-technology sectors. In an OECD survey, respondents 
from the ICT sector were the most likely to report increases in outward licensing (about 80 percent 
of respondents), suggesting that outward-licensing has become an important source of revenue 
for ICT firms. In contrast, respondents from the pharmaceutical industry were most likely to 
report increases in inward-licensing (about 80 percent of respondents), reflecting the trend of 
licensing-in from small biotechnology firms. International licensing also appears to be on the 
rise and accounts for a significant share of total patent licensing. Receipts from world-wide 
licensing appear to have grown steadily since the mid-1980s. While receipts remain considerably 
higher in the United States than in the EU or Japan, growth rates in the latter have been equal 
or faster over the past 20 years.
At the national level, indicators of technology licensing also show significant increases. In 
European countries, OECD data on receipts from international licensing and transfers of patents 
show steep increases in France and Germany during the 1990s. In France receipts increased by 
more than a factor of seven between 1990 and 2003 from EUR 330 million to EUR 2.4 billion (not 
taking into account inflation), while in Germany they doubled from EUR 1.3 billion to EUR 2.7 
billion. In contrast, receipts remained relatively flat in Italy at roughly EUR 200m to EUR 300m 
per year. 
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as the technology progresses towards commercialisation. The “funding gap” arises in between, the 
point where government and philanthropic funds begin to run out but the technology’s risk profile 
still discourages VC and licensing investments.
Figure 3.  Technology transfer process
Oversight by technology
transfer office

























Source:  Seget (2008).
The TT funding gap has been around for some time, but was magnified after the stock market and VC 
downturn in 2001 and also in the current crisis. Generating a successful initial public offering (IPO) or 
trade-sale exit for a venture capitalist has become more difficult, which in turn has put increased 
pressure on associated royalty rates and spin-out terms. As venture capitalists have become more 
conservative, moving new technologies from public funding to proof of concept has become more 
challenging.
With regard to the financial gap between the R&D patenting stages and the development (of prototypes, 
test series etc.) and the stage of commercialisation, the difficulty to assess the value of patents limits 
the advance toward the production stage. To adequately quantify the value of patents and patent 
portfolios, the licensing potential needs to be analysed. However, selling and buying technology is 
not costless; for example, initial investment is frequently needed to screen and identify a licensee, an 
outlay which patent holders are rarely willing to make due to uncertainty on their licensing potential. 
Patent Value Funds attempt to uncover both the financial gaps faced by the IP holders and their licensing 
potential. These are institutional funds that invest in patent portfolios, acting as intermediaries, making 
IP sellers and buyers meet and pulling off contracting easier to both parties.4
Therefore, TT can be envisaged as an intermediary institution for technologies and innovations aimed 
at facilitating the commercialisation and use of IP generated mainly in the research sector. The 
development of innovation networks linked to major companies and of technology markets, notably 
around IP exchange platforms creates new opportunities for adequate intermediary structures for 
innovation. New forms of commercialisation of IPs should be supported by appropriate financial 
instruments.
4    IP can also be securitised. Names mentioned in the literature in relation to monetisation and securitisation are, for example, 
Intellectual Ventures, ThinkFire, Capital Value Partners, Ocean Tomo Capital Fund, Microsoft Intellectual Property Ventures. 
IP can also be transferred via public auctions; a company offering a marketplace is e.g. Ocean Tomo Intellectual Capital 
Equity. 
The funding gap has 
been magnified in the 
current crisis.
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3.  A review of the technology transfer market
Data for Europe on the commercialisation of public science have not been available until recently. 
Information about patenting and licensing is opaque. The size and evolution of technology licensing 
markets – in general and not only with regard to commercialisation of public science – is difficult to 
measure because of a lack of robust statistics. This has been confirmed in discussions with leading 
experts. Most patent licensing is based on private contracts that are subject to confidentiality 
agreements, meaning that comprehensive time-series data on patent licensing are not available. The 
TT market is sizeable, also against the background of the EU’s innovation strategy. Despite the funding 
gap TT is a fast growing market. One proxy for the growth in the TT market is to track EU patent 
applications at the European Patent Office, which experienced a growth of 40 percent between 1997 
and 2007 overall, and more than 70 percent for patents owned by universities (OECD 2008). 
The number of university start-ups has started being used as an indicator of TT success, particularly 
in Europe. However, such a measure ignores the eventual success of such activity and whether or not 
it is preferable to other forms of TT. This criticism, that undue focus on spin-out companies has negatively 
affected other transfer mechanisms such as technology licensing, is discussed in the literature but 
there is little empirical evidence. From various surveys it appears that in comparison with licensing, 
spin-outs play a more important role in Europe than in the US. But there is no evidence of an optimal 
spin-out level or an optimal licensing level. According to another line of argument, it is difficult for 
European TTOs) to find licensing partners for their technologies and they are instead progressing via 
spin-outs. In a way, European TT offices might be constrained to create the institutional partners 
(companies) that they do not find readily on the market.
Only a few studies have analysed the success of TT and TTOs. The recent literature analyzing the efficiency 
and determinants of university TT focuses on studying American universities (e.g. Jensen and Thursby 
2001; Lach and Schankerman 2008). This is mainly because of their longer history in the commercialisation 
of academic research and the availability of university-level datasets containing rich information on 
universities’ TT activities. The main findings from recent empirical studies (e.g. Proton 2008; ASTP 2008; 
Business Insights 2008 and Milken Institute 2006) may be summarized as follows: 
Technology transfer policies and strategies matter. Studies have underlined the importance of 
adopting an institutionalized and strategic approach towards the commercialisation of research 
activities by universities. Such institutional strategies may cover institutional procedures, organizational 
structures or management processes that allow universities to exploit their R&D portfolio without 
hampering the fundamental university mission of teaching and research. Maximising TT to industry 
is not necessarily in conflict with the mission of universities to perform basic research – indeed the 
opposite can be argued. Several studies (notably by van Looy et al. 2006) have shown that researchers 
who patent more are also those who publish more in scientific journals, controlling for their seniority, 
field of research etc. Survey evidence for the US shows that researchers often lack the interest to 
participate in TT (Siegel et al. 2003; Thursby et al. 2001). Theoretical work by Jensen and Thursby (2001) 
and Macho-Stadler et al. (1996) shows that well-defined licensing contracts can help in this respect by 
providing the right incentive mechanisms to ensure inventors’ cooperation in the disclosure of an 
invention and its later commercialisation. Lach and Schankerman (2008) find strong empirical support 
for this intuition and show the importance of well-devised inventor royalty sharing rules for university 
performance in terms of licensing.5 Based on a panel of US universities they find that universities giving 
5    But university patents are not only about creating financial or market value. For example, university patents play an 
important role in creating knowledge spillovers, building networks with other academics and venture capitalists and 
catalysing university-industry recognition (Striukova 2009b). 
Compared with 
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a higher share of royalties to the inventor generate more inventions and higher licensing income. This 
incentive effect appears to work both by inducing the sorting of scientists across universities and by 
increasing scientists’ efforts. TT outcomes are also a function of commercialisation strategies. Licensing 
provides the most common mechanism for TT but spin-out companies have become increasingly 
popular. Licensing agreements tend to work best in established TT offices with access to well-funded 
research projects. By contrast, spin-out ventures tend to be more prevalent in markets where research 
funds are more limited and where commercial licensing partners are less willing to share risk on 
academic research discoveries. However, licensing statistics have to be read carefully – survey results 
of higher licensing income can be attributed to the higher average age of (US-) university license 
portfolios. In addition, in the US, licensing income is highly concentrated, with a small number of 
universities, both private (Harvard, Stanford) and public (the University of California system) making 
the bulk of the market.
The key role of the intermediary structure. Successful TT not only depends on the quality of the 
research and the involvement of the inventor, but crucially also on the size and the experience of the 
TTO. Among others, Siegel et al. (2003) find that larger TTOs generate more TT outcomes. TTO experience 
in the transfer of technology is also important. Friedman and Silberman (2003) and Lach and Schankerman 
(2004) find that older TTOs execute more licenses, and suggest that efficiency gains arise as TTOs gain 
experience in the management of university TT. Friedman and Silberman (2003) further suggest that 
the TTO’s age matters because to be successful TTOs need to build a qualitative portfolio of inventions, 
which takes time. On average, TTOs in the US benefit from larger research endowments and have had 
more time to develop than their European, Canadian and Australian counterparts. The TT function 
involves significant time-lags. It is only as TT offices are given the time to develop and mature that 
they begin to generate sustainable income streams and as a result are able to justify further investment. 
The ability to build strong relationships with both university faculty and external commercial partners 
also benefits from time and experience. According to a study by UNU-Merit (Arundel and Bordoy 2006) 
the key differences between TT practices across countries can be explained by the size of the respective 
research budgets and the maturity (experience) of the TT function. Moreover, geographical differences 
in regulations6 and location contexts have a significant impact on TT practices and results.
The characteristics of public research institutions. A number of recent empirical studies have found 
that the size of the university, as measured by the number of academic staff is positively related with 
the amount of TT (e.g. Belenzon and Schankerman 2008). Besides size, previous research finds that the 
research quality of the university also matters. Universities producing higher-quality research, as 
measured by the quality of their doctoral programmes, generate more licenses and higher licensing 
income as shown by Chukumba and Jensen (2005). Thursby and Kemp (2002) further suggest that the 
portfolio of disciplines present at the university could also play a distinctive role as some sciences are 
more likely than others to produce research that can be transferred to industry. Recent empirical studies 
find support for this hypothesis and show that the presence of biomedical and engineering faculties 
appear to be associated with higher levels of patenting and licensing activity (e.g. Lach and Schankerman 
2008). Moreover, a number of studies have shown that private universities are more efficient, as 
measured in terms of scientific publications and various outcomes of TT activity (Adams and Griliches 
1998; Siegel et al. 2003). Beyond these differences in the level of efficiency Lach and Schankerman 
(2008) show that scientists at private institutions are more responsive to royalty incentives. The wealth 
of private universities (endowment) and different criteria for the selection of researchers could explain 
this difference in responsiveness.
6    An interesting tool to compare various national IP regimes can be found here: http://www.eutechnologytransfer.eu/
compare.php.
Universities giving a 
higher share of royalties 
to inventors generate 
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Clusters, proximity and openness still matter. Existing research suggests the importance of 
geographic concentration for successful university-industry relations (Agrawal and Cokburn 2003) and 
the relevance of spillovers of academic research (Jaffe 1989; Jaffe et al. 1993; Henderson et al. 1998). 
For instance, Mansfield (1998) who explores the relationship between academic and industrial R&D 
suggests that universities are more likely to license technology to firms located nearby as the further 
development of the technology often requires further collaborative efforts: TT is often a proximity 
activity, requiring much face-to-face interaction. The development of open innovation set-ups is 
expected to strengthen the role of proximity notably to deal with commercialisation of IPs based on 
tacit knowledge and requiring trust between partners. That said, new communication technologies 
also enable collaboration among individuals or entities based in different locations. 
Is Europe so different from the US? US TTOs are more effective in generating invention disclosures, 
patent applications and grants than their European peers. However, European TTOs appear to require 
a smaller level of research expenditure to generate licensing agreements and start-ups than their US 
peers. The share of licensing revenue for university TT as a percentage of research expenditure is 
around 1 percent in Europe but closer to 3 percent in the US. One explanation for the lower licensing 
returns is a greater reliance on start-ups in Europe.7 Higher start-up activity and relatively low licensing 
activity in Europe is also to be put in relation with the lower royalties available for academic inventors 
in Europe compared with the US. A second explanation could be the advanced market-readiness of 
projects in the US: Projects at US universities are better financed and further developed towards their 
relevant markets than in Europe.
Improving the commercialisation of IP and filling the gap with the US, notably in terms of shifting from 
research and proof-of-concept grants towards commercial funding, will require access to adequate 
financial instruments. Financial instruments in the TT segment are not well developed to date. 
Discussions with market participants in different industry sectors make it clear that a very significant 
potential exists for specialized investment vehicles focusing on the TT segment.
The change in the innovation process has led to the emergence of new collaborative mechanisms such 
as patent pools8 or innovation platforms requiring appropriate intermediate mechanisms for the 
commercialisation of IP. Knowledge exploitation appears as a key issue in open innovation strategies 
especially in the upstream phase. New forms of joint IP or IP sharing require adequate management 
tools and alignment of incentives not always developed in research organisations.
The notion of “Technology market” encompasses a range of different mechanisms by which buyers 
and sellers trade various forms of knowledge: Buyers and sellers can pool or trade IP, data, information, 
contacts and know-how. Intellectual property exchanges and patent pools, consortia, networking, 
matching or brokering services, clearing houses, knowledge warehouses and auctions enter into this 
broadly defined concept. The current market situation (market needs, unused high-tech potential, 
7    The Lambert Review criticises too little licensing and too many unsustainable spin-outs (for the UK): „… there are signs that 
the pendulum has swung too far and that too many spin-outs are now being created, some of low quality. … Despite a 
fall in 2002, many more spin-outs are created as a proportion of research expenditure than in the US and Canada. … but 
these spin-out rates come at a cost to licensing. … nine new university technologies are licensed for every spin-out that is 
formed in US, compared to only four in the UK.“ (Lambert Review of Business 2003, p. 58f.) However, the Lambert Review’s 
criticism, that undue focus on spin-out companies has negatively affected technology licensing, has been addressed in 
an article by Ederyn Williams (Warwick Ventures). He shows that the poorer performance of UK universities in generating 
licensing income can be entirely attributed to the higher average age of US university license portfolios (Library House, 
2007).
8    A patent pool can provide an incentive for further innovation by enabling its members to share the risks associated to R&D. 
Patent pools can also increase the likelihood that a company will recover some, if not all, of its investment in R&D (Striukova, 
2009).
There is a significant 
potential for specialized 
investment vehicles 
focusing on technology 
transfer.
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funding gap between basic research and commercialisation, funding gap of exploiting the whole 
range of technology) leads to many opportunities to develop innovative funding, both SME-related 
and project-related instruments.
The financial instruments in these markets – and these are not the standard VC tools – are not yet fully 
developed. However, discussions over the last years with market players from different sectors have 
made it clear that a sizeable potential for specialized investment companies exists. This is true for the 
seed stage, but also for the full exploitation of IP.
The financial crisis has further intensified the “traditional” funding issues for the exploitation of R&D. 
In general, there has been (and still is) a sharp decline in private-equity fundraising activities; early-
stage VC is currently more stable than other phases, but also at a much lower level than before. Reasons 
for the sharp slowdown of fundraising activities are mainly uncertainty due to the ongoing crisis, the 
strong level of activity in previous years (2005 to 2007), and also uncertainty about the impact on 
valuations. According to private-equity statistics (e.g. Deloitte, EVCA 2009) many VCs are optimistic 
about their future funds – however, VCs are looking to governments as their financial partners because 
they see their traditional investor base – commercial banks, investment banks, corporate operating 
funds, insurance companies and public pension funds – to be drying up.
4.  Key lessons learnt from the EIF experience 
As outlined above, TT can take various routes which sometimes differ in substantial ways from better-
known financial instruments such as debt/guarantees and equity investments. This section summarises 
key lessons from EIF’s experience in TT investing. An overview of EIF’s operational activities is given in 
the Annex.
4.1  Financial design: Privileged access to deal flow and “Bears’ hugs” 
TT operations are often organised in partnership with research centres, universities or other structures. 
In this context, successful operations often benefit from privileged access to spin-outs originating 
from such innovation centres. Fostering and maintaining privileged relationships with those centres 
does not always make it possible (let alone desirable) to press for the typical governance/structuring 
features of VC, such as arms’ length principles, conflict of interest parameters etc. 
This is a departure from standard structuring features and requires a specific approach and skills for 
successful implementation. In fact, the further upstream the project in the investment spectrum, the 
less certain standard features of equity investing are applicable – they can even become outright 
damaging, much like debt standards when applied to equity. The issue is about risk: At this intermediate 
stage, technology is more developed than basic knowledge but it is not developed enough yet for its 
market applications to have the degree of certainty that standard capital providers require. Appropriate 
solutions must be found which address the specifics of this market segment rather than trying to 
superimpose solutions which work in other environments.
4.2  Implementation issues - private co-investors
TT investing is an emerging area within finance. Consequently, it is not an established asset class among 
“market-oriented investors” – to an even more significant extent than technology VC which itself is 
increasingly shunned by the private sector. 
With the financial crisis, 
VC funds have turned 
to governments as 
financial partners as 
their traditional investor 
base has dried up.
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As regards structuring, limits in the level of public investment at first closings of funds are often an 
obstacle. Typically this specific rule is a legacy of VC or other private-equity investment guidelines, 
which is ceteris paribus applied to TT as if it was the same market segment. At the time of writing, 
market conditions are such that EIF and similar investors are often led to take up to 50 percent of 
first closings in their VC and private-equity investments. Therefore, an emerging area such as TT 
could greatly benefit from a similar approach.
4.3  Business development effort and lead-time
This is an emerging market, which lacks existing teams periodically submitting well-structured 
investment proposals. This mirrors the funding gap at this stage. EIF’s role is to partner with leading 
research and innovation organisations in order to develop products and approaches resulting in 
“investable” operations by EIF and other investors. This resource-intensive, “tailor-made” approach 
entails a high attrition rate, which is counterbalanced by the fact that it positions EIF as the partner 
of choice with leading innovation centres. 
4.4  Longer time horizons: Average size currently smaller than other areas
Successful TT investing requires a long-term approach, with fifteen, twenty year (and beyond) 
horizons being sometimes necessary. Also, the average size of investments in this area can be 
significantly smaller than in the typical private-equity operations. 
5.  Potential activities to meet market needs
Investing in support of knowledge transfer from universities to industry calls for new financing 
models which could address both the information and risk patterns of this activity (in-between public 
and market research). The availability of such instruments is a necessary condition for attracting 
larger amounts of private capital without which inventions cannot be transformed into innovations. 
In order to meet the markets’ needs, public support should be provided through a flexible tool set, 
adapted to a variety of situations and needs. The remainder of the section explains potential future 
options for the EIF.
5.1  Extension of current TT activities 
EIF, like other investors, has so far focused on leading European universities/research institutions, 
ruling out smaller operations. However, public-sector investors like EIF could also address smaller or 
less prominent universities and research centres. Indeed Europe has a significant number of 
universities/research centres producing numerous spin-outs. Given the growing number of teams 
that have professionalised their TT approach over time, this could open up a new market segment 
for investors if addressed with the right instruments and approach. Another growing trend is the 
emergence of trans-national operations, creating a critical mass in terms of deal flow, network and 
competencies. 
5.2  Licensing operations
In TT through licensing, the IP developed within a research organisation is “licensed” by the research 
organisation to a production company. This license can be exclusive or not, is often limited to certain 
TT financing may 
require a high share 
of the public investor, 
significant development 
efforts and long time 
horizons – for often 
modest amounts  
per deal.
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market segments or countries as well as in time. The IP can potentially also be acquired by the 
company. 
Licensing operations can take various forms. Often the IP developed at research organisations is not 
mature enough to be licensed or sold directly to companies but requires further validation of the 
technology (e.g. by building a prototype or carrying out pre-clinical testing) before it is in a position 
to attract industrial buyers. Funding for such activities is mostly not in place within research 
organisations. Licensing TT operations can address precisely this funding gap. What is needed is an 
investor who could fund the further development of the technology by paying for the activities 
required to make the IP more mature. In return, the TT Operation receives a share of the IP and the 
associated revenue streams in case the IP is licensed out or sold. Financing of this kind is of great 
value as it ensures that valuable technologies are not left unused within academia. This type of 
operation is complementary to that of seed and early-stage funds, which invest in companies (not 
in projects or IP assets) and which only partially address the TT process. 
Licensing operations can take other forms such as Project Funds, IP Funds, Royalty Funds, IP Line 
Extension and IP Live Extension Projects, IP carve out projects etc. A more detailed description can 
be found in Table 1. on the following page.
Because of the portfolio aspects as well as long lead times, “licensing” or “royalty” market segments 
lend themselves to complex financial engineering encompassing securitisation techniques and 
secondary approaches, which can be a more efficient form of funding than equity.
5.3  Corporate venturing and larger commercial TT operations
Corporate venturing or corporate VC can be defined as the practice whereby a large firm takes an 
equity stake in a small innovative or specialist firm to which it may also provide management and 
marketing expertise. The objective of corporate VC is to gain a specific competitive advantage as 
well as to achieve a return. Corporate funds focusing on early-stage investments can be used as a 
tool to gain access to new technologies, often developed in the research organisations relevant to 
the industries on which the corporate venture fund focuses. In some cases the fund may also invest 
in companies spun out of the parent organisation, for instance to commercialise IP in an industry 
segment not relevant to the parent organisation. Corporate venture funds can be managed by teams 
which are still strongly linked to the parent company or by teams held at arms length. Some corporate 
funds attract third-party investors at fund level. The individual ticket size of this type of transaction 
is larger than for the other TT activities described in this section.
5.4  University seed funds
Another area of development consists in supporting numerous university (pre)-seed funds. These 
funds are often in collaboration with a single university and managed by a small local team. In this 
area, the return expectations are very limited. However, these funds play an important role in the 
creation of numerous technology spin-outs and, hence, significantly contribute to the 
commercialisation of academic research. This approach could be taken to a higher level, through 
operations bringing together several universities in order to create more sizeable spin-out funds 
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The IP developed within a research organisation is “licensed” to a(n industrial) company. 
License is exclusive or not, with often limited coverage (market segments, countries, and 
time). See the discussion in Section 5.2 of the main text. Note that existing or planned 
initiatives in this area are often either supported by non-EU private groups (e.g. Royaltypharma 
2009 using a securitisation angle; Paul Capital 2009 following a secondaries strategy; and 
Intellectual Ventures 2009 with a translational lab focus), or by national public groups without 
a European remit (e.g. the initiative by CDC to establish an organisation to commercialise 
patents from public-sector research). 
Projects  
funds
Shares some features with upstream VC. However, investments are made not in a company 
but in projects. Overhead costs are initially low because it can be decided at a later stage 
whether to commercialise the IP through licensing or through a spin-out. The ownership of 
the IP developed within these projects needs to be contractually agreed upfront. Similar to 
some existing university proof-of-concept funds.
IP funds 
Investments are made into individual IP assets (e.g. patents), which have a potential to be 
commercialised. Different investment strategies can be applied. One strategy consists in 
buying portfolios of existing but (nearly) unused patents, often in batches at reduced prices. 
Grouping individual patents into “patent families” (or bundles) can be valuable to potential 
buyers (or licensors) of the technology by allowing them to fully protect their use of key 
technologies. Another strategy consists in selectively acquiring clusters of patents and 
building project teams around these technologies to further develop them to the point 
where they are attractive to commercial buyers. Such funds contribute to transferring existing 
IP assets into the commercial world.
Royalty  
funds
Fund buys the rights to the future royalty streams linked to a specific patent of or pools of 
patens. This is applicable for patents that are already commercialised (or close to 
commercialisation). By doing so, the fund increases the liquidity of the markets for 
patents.
IP line  
extension 
projects
Project financing is needed to develop further products on existing and already 
commercialised IP. The commercial use of existing IP-protected technologies can be extended 
with the development of tailored products for specific markets and customer profiles. 
Example: Schwarz Pharma asked for the financing of a clinical study in order to get market 
approval of a molecule already on the market for another indication. As a result, Schwarz 
would have been able to double revenues on their existing IP with only some minor IP 
extensions. An investor such as EIF could finance (part of) these developments in the form 
of project finance (also on a portfolio basis).
IP carve out 
projects
Spin-off or licensing-out of specific IP families that protect a potential new product from 
existing companies. Main driver is the lack of financing for second-line products which often 
bear higher potential than the first line but have more onerous product development. The 
cost of product development could then be addressed through TT financing, e.g. in the form 
of an SME or a special-purpose vehicle (SPV).
Secondary  
use of IP
Most (major) innovative companies manage their IP portfolio actively, often maintaining IP 
portfolios which are not in the (new) focus of the company. Also, stressed (tech) companies 
struggling for survival try to sell their IP when the underlying product development is at a 
too early stage but IP, know-how, skilled staff and results are in place. Acquiring the necessary 
IP and creating a new appropriate structure is a potential target of a TT transaction. 
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6.  Conclusion
Global policy discussions9 increasingly focus on innovation and the knowledge economy as a driver 
of long-term growth. In parallel, new forms of innovation processes are emerging, notably open 
innovation and innovation networks, stressing the importance of links and connections between the 
various stakeholders. Older business and innovation models do not hold anymore, and likewise new 
financing models have to emerge. Investment in supporting innovation calls for new financing models, 
particularly in knowledge commercialisation and diffusion. Direct support to TT, Pre-seed and Seed, 
Business Angels, and incubators are important instruments, notably through a more active 
commercialisation of intellectual property. IP management has to be integrated in these strategies 
from the outset, as IP is a major instrument for transferring knowledge and generating revenue. 
Scaling up TT as a policy measure to support the commercialisation of research is a separate area within 
the financing arena, with its own characteristics requiring a targeted approach and dedicated financial 
products and approaches. Financial engineering in this market segment must be flexible and blend 
financial products as needed (certainly equity but also guarantees, lending etc.) to share the risk 
between universities, inventors, entrepreneurs and investors appropriately and to maximise the 
potential value of IP so as to make this IP a powerful attractor for further capital. 
9    See e.g. Executive Office of the President (2009) and European Commission (2009b).
New innovation 
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Annex:  EIF’s TT activities so far 
Profile Examples Comments
Spin-off portfolio IP Venture Fund A GBP 32 million co-investment fund in which EIF invested 
GBP 14 million and which reached its first close in September 
2006. The fund systematically co-invests 25 percent of the 
financing round of spin-outs originating from the 10 universities 
with which IP group has commercialisation agreements. These 
include Oxford Chemistry, Oxford Engineering, Queen Mary 
College, King’s College London, Southampton, Bath, Bristol, 
Leeds, Glasgow, York, and Surrey universities.
Next-generation 
licensing 
Leuven/CD3 CD3, the Centre for Drug Design and Discovery financed jointly 
by EIF (EUR 4 million) and the University of Leuven 
(EUR 4 million) in 2006, finances early-stage drug development 
projects, bridging the gap between academic research and 
the point where large pharma companies are willing to get 
involved. A successor fund is under consideration.
University seed 
fund 
UMIP Premier Fund The UMIP Premier Fund is a GBP 32 million fund, closed in April 
2008, corner-stoned by EIF with a GBP 9 million investment. 
The fund is dedicated to spin-out companies originating from 
the University of Manchester and performs investments ranging 
from proof-of-concept, seed and A/B rounds. The fund is 
managed by MTI partners, a technology VC.
University / 
Incubator fund
University X (name 
deleted) 
Innovation
The University X (name deleted) Innovation Seed Fund is a 
EUR 10.5 million fund, sponsored by EIF with EUR 5.25 million. 
EIF worked together with the University and the incubator in 
the structuring and set-up of the fund. The fund reached its 
first close in July 2008 and has since already performed five 
investments in promising start-up companies. The fund invests 
in start-up companies originating from the university and other 
innovative centres in the Gothenburg region. 
Two-step spin-off 
portfolio
University Y (name 
deleted), under 
completion
EIF envisages an investment in partnership with the University 
Y (name deleted) Institute in the life sciences sector to finance 
spin-outs in Sweden and the Nordic region. EIF would invest 
into a dedicated structure, the University Y Co-Investment 
Fund, in which it would be the main or a major investor and 
which would systematically co-invest alongside University Y 
Development at a fixed ratio. The fund would provide seed 
financing to newly created spin-out companies as well as 
follow-on financing to the existing portfolio of approximately 
40 companies created by University Y Development since 
2003.
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assistance with preparing the manuscript. The usual caveat applies. 
Financing  constraints  have  been  discussed  as  a 
major  obstacle  to  innovation.  Small  and  medium-
sized  enterprises  and  start-ups  are  particularly 
concerned by such impediments. Venture capital has 
emerged  as  a  partial  solution  in  some  countries, 
but  is  only  available  for  start-up  firms  with  major 
growth potential. Recently, new intermediaries have 
attempted to provide external finance to innovative 
firms  based  on  the  firms’  patent  portfolios.  Patents 
have been used as collateral or as assets assembled 
in patent funds seeking to commercialize the patent 
rights.  Patent  auctions  are  indicative  of  a  nascent 
market for patented technology. This paper presents 
an overview on the role of patents and licenses, both 
in the classical sense and as instruments for financing 
innovation.  It  also  discusses  implications  of  these 
developments  for  public  policy  and  the  design  of 
patent systems. 
VOL_2_04_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_2_HARHOFF.indd   74 23/12/09   14:17:01EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°2   2009            75
Dietmar Harhoff
The role of patents and licenses 
in securing external finance   
for innovation
1.  Introduction
The economic literature has analyzed a number of problems that stand in the way of an efficient 
allocation of resources to R&D and innovation in a market economy. Among them are the well-known 
externalities that emerge from knowledge having characteristics of public goods. Moreover, it has 
been suggested in theoretical and empirical studies that there are financing constraints for particular 
types of firms and activities, such as research and development. These constraints limit the extent to 
which firms engage in R&D and innovation, even if no knowledge externalities are present. A more 
recent literature has focused on a third problem and argues that the market for intermediate outputs 
of the innovation process (such as ideas, patents, licences, blue-prints, prototypes, etc.) is incomplete. 
The first two problems lead to inefficiently low investment in innovation. The third one leads to 
inefficiently low extent in the division of labour, since the market for technology (defined as the 
aforementioned intermediate outputs) is not transparent and does not function well at this point. 
Transactions have to be internalized, and gains from specialization are lost.
This paper is mostly concerned with the latter two problems which are intricately linked.1 At the root 
of them lies the same phenomenon – the idiosyncratic nature of technology, largely following firm-
specific paths of development, coupled with asymmetric information on alternative uses, substitutes 
and values. If a market for intermediate results of innovation processes existed, then the financing 
constraints of innovative firms would probably be less pronounced. Intermediate results could be 
licensed, sold, leased or become part of other financial transactions, which would relax the financing 
constraints problem. The topic of this paper is the role that patent rights do or could play in the 
establishment of such markets for technology and as an instrument to support the financing of 
innovation.
The following sections develop these thoughts in some detail. First, a brief summary of the classical 
theoretical arguments pertaining to financing constraints, pecking orders and cost of capital is given. 
In Section 3, classical uses of patents and licenses are summarized and discussed. Section 4 discusses 
relatively novel uses of patents as instruments for securing external finance. Section 5 provides a 
discussion of how modern patent systems are or could be designed to support the financial functions 
of patents. Section 6 concludes.
2.   Theoretical and empirical evidence on financing gaps
Hidden information, hidden action and incompleteness of contracts impact debt and equity finance. 
The following sections briefly review how these market imperfections lead to financing problems – in 
particular for small and young firms and for innovative enterprises.
2.1  Asymmetric information and pecking orders
The impact of asymmetric information on financing has been studied in particular detail for debt 
finance. Credit markets differ from standard commodity markets in that the lender delivers a loan on 
1    The material presented here builds on earlier work with Carolin Haeussler and Elisabeth Mueller, as well as work with Karin 
Hoisl, Georg von Graevenitz and Stefan Wagner. 
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the borrower’s promise to pay back the loan and interest. The lender’s evaluation of the borrower’s 
capability to pay back is crucial for the lending decision. Equilibrium quantity rationing emerges 
endogenously due to asymmetric information (the lender knows less about the borrower than the 
borrower himself) and incompleteness of contracts (contractual agreements to control all aspects of 
borrower behaviour are infeasible). In the case of rationing, the lender will decide not to grant a loan 
to the borrower, even if the borrower offers a higher interest rate than is observed in the market for 
loans. Thus, the supply of loans does not equate the demand at the market interest rate. 
The underlying cause for all credit rationing phenomena can be traced back to selection and incentive 
effects imposed by interest rates. Adverse selection occurs, since the average quality of borrowers will 
be a decreasing function of the interest rate charged by the lender. Moreover, as the interest rate 
increases a borrower will be tempted to undertake riskier projects unless the loan is fully collateralized. 
As a consequence, either some lenders are not able to obtain any loan, or the loan size will be below 
the one demanded by the borrower (Bester and Hellwig 1987). If collateral is in short supply for firms, 
then the firm may have projects that would be worth financing, but cannot be pursued because of 
the lack of debt finance. As we discuss later, this is particularly likely in innovation projects which largely 
produce intangible assets as intermediate output.
In response to a lack of debt finance, firms may want to issue equity. But asymmetric information and 
moral hazard may prevent managers from doing so as Myers and Majluf (1984) show. They analyze the 
effects of asymmetric information if managers have privileged knowledge about the true value of 
investment projects and the firm’s other assets while investors (or lenders) only know the joint 
distribution of these values until the ex ante random characteristics of the projects are revealed. 
Managers are assumed to act on behalf of “old” shareholders. Issuance of new shares will occur only 
if this is not to the disadvantage of old stockholders, i.e., if the market’s evaluation of the new stock is 
above the respective value for the old stockholders. Thus, managers will only issue shares for investment 
with less than expected value. Consequently, issuing shares will be seen by the new investors as a bad 
signal. Anticipating this, the firm will not issue new shares even if the projects have positive net present 
value. Thus, in the Myers/Majluf model, financing constraints have negative welfare effects. Variations 
of the fundamental theme of the Myers and Majluf paper have been developed in large numbers, but 
the basic idea is the same in these extensions. Given that management acts in the interest of existing 
shareholders, firms will prefer internal finance over debt financing, and debt financing over the issuance 
of new shares. This prediction has found some empirical support (e.g. see the review in Thakor 1993, 
p. 461).
As a result of some of these arguments, Myers and Majluf (1984), inter alia, have postulated a financial 
“pecking order” model. In this model there is no well-defined optimal capital structure as it exists in 
the static Modigliani-Miller model with taxation, but a well-defined ranking of capital costs. Once slack 
resources are exhausted, the firm will have to borrow to satisfy its capital needs. The most expensive 
type of capital will be new equity. In some cases, the firm will rather forego an investment opportunity 
than to issue debt or equity. Exogenous variations in cash flow will lead to more or less investment in 
such a situation.
2.2  Different types of investment: Capital goods versus intangibles
Can financing constraints be particularly important for investment in research and development (R&D) 
or innovation projects? There are a number of reasons why investment in physical capital and investment 
in knowledge capital should be affected differentially by financing constraints, and why obtaining 
external finance for innovation and R&D projects may be more costly than obtaining such funding for 
capital investment. At the same time, fundamental technological differences with respect to the 
Firms prefer internal 
finance over debt and 
debt over new shares, 
reflecting capital costs.
VOL_2_04_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_2_HARHOFF.indd   76 23/12/09   14:17:02EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°2   2009            77
adjustment costs of investment and R&D and differences in tax treatment may work against extensive 
sensitivity of R&D spending to transitory shocks in cash flow. Finally, the impact of uncertainty needs 
to be taken into account.
For the purpose of the present discussion, let us first assume that contrary to most capital investment 
goods (plant, property, and equipment), R&D results such as a new prototype, a design or a patent 
cannot be used as collateral. This is largely still the rule, but there are important exceptions which will 
be considered in Section 4 below. The reasoning behind this assumption is simple: The investment 
share of R&D expenditure is of the order of 10 percent of total R&D expenditure, and most inputs to 
the innovation process are likely to be firm-specific or specific to the new product or process to be 
developed. Under these conditions there is no liquid market where the collateral could be liquidated 
in the case of insolvency. Thus, external financiers cannot expect to recover a significant share of their 
funds from collateralized intangibles. 
Second, for obvious reasons firms may be hesitant to reveal the content and objectives of their R&D 
efforts since this knowledge may leak out to competitors.2 Strategic considerations of this kind will 
tend to maintain and reinforce informational asymmetries. But even without secrecy undermining the 
incentives to share information about R&D projects, the evaluation of long-term risky projects by 
external financiers may be more costly than the assessment of more short-term oriented ones. Thus, 
if providers of finance face greater uncertainty and longer planning horizons with respect to R&D than 
capital investment projects, they will require a higher “lemon’s” premium for the former type of 
investment. Hence, even without rationing behaviour on behalf of banks and other financial institutions, 
there will be a premium to be paid for obtaining external funding for R&D projects. If lenders cannot 
control which type of project will be financed by the loan, then the cost of capital will reflect the 
financiers’ assessment of average project risk. Taken together, these results suggest that R&D-intensive 
firms face a larger difference between capital costs for internal and for external funds than firms with 
few R&D projects.
The cost of capital for investment and for R&D projects may also be affected differentially due to the 
tax treatment of R&D and intangibles. Traditionally, R&D had to be expensed. This is a preferential 
treatment (full depreciation in the year of investment) when compared to capital investment but only 
so if the firm does have a tax debt which can be reduced by the expensed R&D. Young firms with 
extended periods in which no positive tax debt occurs will not profit from this treatment. Moreover, 
carrying the tax losses forward does not fully compensate this disadvantage, either because the value 
of the tax loss declines over time or because some taxation regimes limit the extent to which firms can 
off-set current profits with past losses. An example is the minimum taxation principle in the current 
German tax code which effectively limits the off-setting of profits against losses that have been carried 
forward. Hence, while a young firm may not be able to derive much benefit out of the classical tax 
treatment of R&D, there are actually dangers coming with it. Since the firm does not capitalize its 
intangibles, it runs an increased risk of ending up over-indebted. New taxation and accounting rules 
have therefore tried to address this issue. The US General Accounting Principles (GAP) have included 
a limited right to choose between capitalization and expensing for some time. Such an option is now 
available in most accounting and taxation systems, e.g. under the International Accounting Standards 
IAS 38 and IAS 39. To summarize, for most young firms the R&D expensing rule did not generate any 
advantages in the past, and the current trend towards explicitly listing some intangible assets (but 
only the development component) on the asset side of the balance sheet does not create a particular 
advantage for R&D. 
2    See Mansfield (1985) for some evidence on the speed of information dissemination. Theoretical models of knowledge 
dissemination are presented by Bhattacharya and Ritter (1985) and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1994).
R&D firms may be 
reluctant to reveal their 
R&D efforts – which adds 
to the cost of external 
funds.
VOL_2_04_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_2_HARHOFF.indd   77 23/12/09   14:17:0278            Volume14  N°2   2009           EIB  PAPERS
Taken together, these theoretical arguments suggest that finance for R&D and innovation will be more 
constrained and thus more susceptible to cash-flow variations than capital investment. 
However, there are other considerations that run counter to this conclusion. For one, adjustment costs 
are likely to be higher for R&D than for physical investment. Indeed, it is likely that the R&D process 
cannot be delayed or accelerated to the extent to which this may be possible for capital investment. 
Scientists cannot be fired and rehired without substantial loss of human capital to the firm (and potential 
gains to competitors), and resources employed in R&D cannot simply be used in production (or vice 
versa). This effect will actually dampen the long-term response of R&D to cash flow variation. But since 
the marginal cost of capital is increased – not reduced – by higher marginal adjustment costs, firms 
with high marginal adjustment costs are likely to show more stable R&D expenditure – albeit at a lower 
average level – than firms with low adjustment costs.
The recent economic crisis has triggered new studies on the relationship between uncertainty, the 
business cycle and R&D. Bloom (2007) develops a real-options model in which he analyzes the reaction 
of capital investment and/or R&D to changes in the level of uncertainty. He finds that there have been 
(and currently are) strong fluctuations in economic uncertainty. Higher uncertainty tends to reduce 
aggregate investment, hiring and productivity growth because decision-makers seek to delay important 
decisions. As to R&D, Bloom shows that higher uncertainty reduces the responsiveness of R&D to 
changes in demand conditions and increases the persistence of R&D over time. Nabar and Nicolas 
(2009) study R&D investment behaviour during the Great Depression. They develop a model in which 
firms differ with respect to the precision of their beliefs about the future development of demand. 
Firms with imprecise prior beliefs react more strongly to sector-specific signals than firms with more 
precise information. Their empirical investigation yields interesting insights as well. Their data suggest 
that learning and updating were important determinants of R&D decision making between 1930 and 
1932, but not in the subsequent years till 1936. Access to liquidity was not sufficient to let firms engage 
in R&D – even financially unconstrained firms were apparently not willing to engage in countercyclical 
innovation. The results confirm that uncertainty may seriously undermine R&D and innovation – even 
if financial constraints are not a problem.
The arguments described in the previous sections (and in some cases countervailing ones) have by 
now been tested in a large number of empirical studies. I will not review this evidence in detail, but 
will largely point to survey results instead, in particular to the overview presented by Hall (2002).3 
Summarizing a large number of empirical studies, she concludes that the empirical evidence regarding 
financing constraints or “funding gaps” is fairly clear by now. In particular, there is strong empirical 
evidence in favour of the view that relatively small and young firms (SMEs and start-ups) attempting 
to undertake innovation face relatively high costs of capital. Classical financing institutions are not 
well-prepared to support the financing of innovation in these firms. It is much harder to find convincing 
empirical evidence for the existence of financing constraints in large, established firms. While it may 
still be the case that R&D and innovation in these firms are subject to important externalities (such as 
knowledge spillovers), funding gaps appear to be limited to SMEs and young firms.
2.3  External equity and the emergence of the venture capitalist
The literature summarized above considered debt and public equity markets, but not private equity 
(PE). For the purpose of this study, the most interesting form of PE is venture capital which explicitly 
3  See Hall (2009, in this issue) for an updated overview article. 
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addresses the financing needs of young firms with strong growth prospects, but no assets that could 
be collateralized. Venture capital (VC) is equity or equity-based investment in private companies with 
high potential for growth (see Gompers and Lerner 2000; Kaplan and Strömberg 2003). VC is typically 
organized as a limited partnership. The limited partners – wealthy individuals and institutional investors 
– enter a partnership with experienced venture capitalists (VCs) who act as general partners. The 
partnership typically lasts for about ten years. The funds are then invested in young firms in return for 
preferred stock. VCs also receive important special rights which allow them to influence the management 
of the start-up even if they hold a minority share. Venture capital emerged first at the end of WWII but 
gained in importance in the US during the 1980s when a clarification of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act’s ‘prudent-man’ rule allowed pension funds to invest in high-risk assets, including 
VC. While VC has seen a dramatic development in the US, it has not been successful in a broad set of 
countries, with the UK, Israel, Canada and New Zealand being the exceptions. The lack of an initial-
public-offering (IPO) exit channel is presumably one of the most important impediments for the 
emergence of a functioning VC market in Europe. The emergence of VC can be interpreted as evidence 
that other financing institutions – in particular banks and public markets – have not been able to 
address the financing problems of young firms. It is all the more sobering that the majority of European 
countries and the European Union have not been able to establish a strong VC financing channel for 
young firms.
The positive role of VC in supporting innovation is well established by now (Kortum and Lerner 2000). 
But one needs to point out that VC is restricted in scope – it addresses the financing need of a very 
important, yet small segment of start-ups with particularly high growth potential. Even with a working 
VC market in Europe, a much larger segment of innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
would continue to experience financing problems. 
2.4  A summary
To summarize, funding gaps exist, and they are particularly problematic for SMEs and young firms. 
The emergence of the venture capitalist, a new type of intermediary in the 1960s and 1970s and its 
subsequent success (at least in some countries and regions) can be taken as evidence that the 
financing needs of innovative SMEs and young firms in Europe are not being met by existing 
institutions and players. While these insights are relatively clear cut, many questions are still unresolved 
at this point. As Hall (2002) points out, little is known about the effective  ness of various government 
policies pertaining to institutions such as incubators, pre-seed and seed funding (as in the case of 
the German Hightech Gründerfonds) and other forms of subsidies for start-ups. There is also a lack 
of information as to how corporate-governance regimes and regulation interact with different types 
of information problems that lie at the root of financing constraints for innovation. It will be important 
to analyze how these factors affect innovation. Unfortunately, history has shown that policy 
discussions frequently neglect this aspect and focus on capital investment and issues of depreciation. 
That focus appears more and more outdated – the design of accounting and taxations systems 
should increasingly be concerned with its impact on innovation and training, rather than the 
installation of fixed capital.
Moreover, as the next sections will show, there is a host of relatively new financing arrangements that 
have not received detailed attention in the academic discussion while some innovative financial firms 
and investors are already betting considerable sums on these new arrangements. There is an open 
question if and how the emergence of these new institutions and players should be supported by 
governments. To delineate these novel financing instruments from more classical uses of patents and 




constraints of young 
companies with little 
collateral – but only of 
very fast-growing ones.
VOL_2_04_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_2_HARHOFF.indd   79 23/12/09   14:17:0280            Volume14  N°2   2009           EIB  PAPERS
3.  Classical functions and uses of patents
Patents can be valuable assets to firms because they protect inventions and their transformation to 
innovative products (Cohen et al. 2000 and Dechenaux et al. 2008). Patents may protect the company’s 
competitive position by virtue of their exclusion power. This is essentially saying that patents carry 
private value.4 The most convincing evidence in favour of this view comes from event studies analyzing 
the market response to critical events such as the loss of patent rights in litigation or attacks on patent 
rights in opposition proceedings. Given that litigation cases are usually surprising news, these studies 
come close to an experimental setting. For example, in a study by Marco (2001) the impact of patent 
litigation outcomes on stock prices is analyzed (413 patents of 158 US corporations). These events have 
a significant impact on stock prices. Whenever the validity of patents is confirmed in court rulings, 
stock prices increase by 1 percent on average. “Bad news” (a revocation or narrowing of claims) leads 
to a reduction of stock prices by 0.7 percent on average. More evidence on the contribution of patent 
rights to a corporation’s market value comes from Hall et al. (2005 and 2007) for the US and Sandner 
(2009) for Europe. Haeussler et al. (2009) analyze the impact on share prices of opposition, i.e., a formal 
request by a third party to have the patent revoked. They find that the stock market reacts to patent 
oppositions. Historically, such oppositions lead to a revocation in one third of all cases, and in another 
third of cases they lead to a restriction of the patent right. Hence, oppositions are a real threat to the 
patent-holder. Haeussler et al. (2009) find that stock market reactions are particularly strong in the case 
of oppositions against highly-cited (presumably valuable) European patents, but that stocks appreciate 
if the opposed patent was deemed to be “academic”, i.e., if the patent is associated with a large number 
of prior art references to the scientific literature. While patents can be valuable, there is considerable 
dispersion in the patent value distribution. As a rule of thumb, 90 percent of the value in a patent 
portfolio is accounted for by only 10 percent of the patents (Scherer and Harhoff 2000). Litigation and 
opposition are usually directed at the more valuable patents (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001).
The asset character of patents can be traced back to the fact that they provide protection against full 
competition. In markets with elastic demand, this allows firms to operate at higher margins. Moreover, 
patents convey survival advantages to firms. Cockburn and Wagner (2007) investigate the effect of 
patenting on the survival chances of 356 internet firms that went public at the peak of the stock market 
bubble of the late 1990s. They find that by March 2005, about 66 percent of these firms had delisted 
from the NASDAQ exchange. Fewer than half of the firms in the sample had obtained patent protection. 
Those firms that had done so had significantly longer survival spans than firms without patent protection. 
As the authors show in a detailed econometric analysis, patenting is positively associated with survival. 
Interestingly, this positive result does not appear to hold for business method patents, for which no 
survival advantage was apparent in the estimates.
Even if patents had no asset value (in the sense that they could be subject to transactions), they may 
serve an important purpose in supporting economic transactions such as co-operation on the 
development of an improved technology. Patents safeguard the right of the technology owner and 
allow parties to write contracts based on a well-defined ownership title. A sophisticated version of this 
argument has been put forth by Merges (2005). In Merges’ view, property titles support pre-contractual 
liability and thus grant some protection for disclosure of sensitive information in the period leading 
up to contract formation. Moreover, property provides enforcement flexibility after a contract is signed 
since a property right grants its holder many important advantages in the course of enforcement. 
Property thus supports transactions and would support the emergence of a more transaction-rich 
economy populated with specialized firms.
4  That alone is not sufficient to justify patent systems from a normative perspective. But the lack of conclusive evidence on 
the welfare balance of the patent system continues to vex economists. See Section 5 for comments on this problem.
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While patents are not required to license technology, many technology-licensing contracts are based 
on patent rights. The exact extent of licensing is subject to some uncertainty, but most surveys arrive 
at the conclusion that up to 10 percent of patents are licensed. See Motohashi (2008), Nagaoka and 
Kwon (2006), and Gambardella et al. (2007) for further important studies. Thus a modest volume of 
transactions is taking place already. However, the conditions at which licensing takes place are difficult 
to assess. For example, patents may form complex “thickets” when individual patent rights have 
overlapping and uncertain scope. Patent owners and technology users cannot determine with precision 
which rights they may be infringing upon or if other parties infringe upon their own patents. Rather 
than carrying the legal conflicts to court, firms may choose to cross-license parts of their portfolios or 
even form a pool of patents. In such a situation, patents form the currency for coming to an agreement 
that substitutes for costly resolution in court. In some cases, the cross-licensing arrangement will be 
accompanied by compensatory payments to those parties who contribute a particularly large share 
of patent rights. Cross-licensing differs conceptually from licensing of specific patents since it is used 
to avoid legal controversy, not to trade technology rights.
Patents also serve other purposes, such as demonstrating the technological prowess of the applicant 
or as a visible sign of technical competence of the inventor named on the patent. These functions 
should not be belittled. Given that patent offices offer their search services at subsidized fee levels, 
some corporations even use the patent system as an evaluation device of their corporate R&D staff. 
In the PatVal-EU survey, inventors named on EPO-granted patent rights were asked whether their 
patents were used for commercial or industrial purposes, or if they were licensed (Giuri et al. 2007). 
They were also asked to rate the importance of different motivations for patenting (on a 1-5 scale), 
including licensing, cross-licensing and strategic reasons like blocking competitors. The survey 
distinguishes between the following six uses of the patents: 
Internal use. The patent is exploited internally for commercial or industrial purposes, it can be  •	
used in a production process or incorporated in a product; 
Licensing. The patent is not used internally by the applicant, but it is licensed out to another  •	
party;
Cross-licensing. The patent is licensed to another party in exchange for another patented  •	
innovation; 
Licensing & use. The patent is both licensed to another party and used internally by the applicant  •	
organisation;
Blocking patent. The patent is used neither internally nor for licensing, and was applied for to  •	
block competitors; and
Sleeping patents. The patent is not employed in any of the uses described above. It may still have  •	
option value to the holder as an asset protecting a completely different technical approach, but it 
unfolds no blocking effect with respect to competitors.
The analysis by Giuri et al. (2007) shows that slightly more than half of the patents were exploited by 
the applicant organisation for industrial and commercial purposes. About 36 percent were not used, 
with about half of them being blocking patents and the other half sleeping patents. Finally, 6.4 percent 
of the patents were licensed, 4 percent were both licensed and internally used, and 3 percent were 
used in cross-licensing agreements. 
Of particular interest are differences between large firms and SMEs. Overall, the small firms licensed 
out 26 percent of their patents and left 18 percent unused. This is in contrast to large firms which 
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licensed out only 10 percent of the patents and left 40 percent of their patents unused. Hence, firm 
size and firm type explain a large part of the variation in the extent to which patents are used or 
licensed. As shown in earlier contributions (e.g. Mowery et al. 2001), public or private research 
organisations and universities license a large fraction of their technologies and do not use them 
internally. 
Even if part of the results may be accounted for by the fact that large firms have lower marginal costs 
of patenting and thus maintain some share of patents in their portfolio for merely strategic reasons, 
these results are in line with the notion that SMEs will seek to license technology in order to open a 
source of financing for their enterprises, and that SMEs would profit more from a functioning market 
for licenses than larger firms. There is strong agreement on this point in the literature. More support 
for it has recently come from studies undertaken by the OECD (Zuniga and Guellec 2009) and by a 
team of US researchers (Graham et al. 2009).
4.  Patents as financing tools
4.1  The market for technology
Recent research following the work by Arora et al. (2004) has emphasized the importance of a market 
for technology. This notion refers to the market exchange of non-embodied technology. Most of the 
economics literature has followed the assumption that trading non-embodied technology, e.g. ideas, 
know-how and patents, is considerably more difficult than trading the embodiment of such knowledge, 
for example, in the form of machines and other artefacts. The classical argument points at the low rates 
of licensing and patent trade. As the above sections have shown, licensing is indeed relatively rare, 
although many patents are not utilized.
The overall monetary volume of licensing transactions has been the subject of some research and of 
speculation. It is important to note that licensing (in the sense of granting access to technology) occurs 
for a number of reasons, some of which have little to do with genuine market exchange. For example, 
within multi-national enterprises (MNEs) licensing can be used to shift profits towards a low-tariff tax 
jurisdiction. Given the intangible nature of intellectual property, the transfer of a patent right to a 
subsidiary in a low-tax country could be followed by high royalty payments from the high-tax to the 
low-tax location of the MNE. A large share of international trade occurs within MNEs (Maskus 2000). 
The use of intangibles for “tax optimization” purposes should therefore be an important aspect in the 
empirical picture, but its extent is unknown. Furthermore, licensing is difficult to separate from 
conceptually different activities, such as cross-licensing for the purpose of avoiding litigation. In this 
case, there is no genuine trade or transactions indicative of a market, but merely an avoidance of legal 
confrontation.
Arora et al. (2004) estimate that the world market for technology has had a volume of about USD 35-50 
billion in the mid-1990s. The estimate includes licenses and the transfer of know-how as well as transfers 
based on other forms of collaboration such as production and marketing. Athreye and Cantwell (2007) 
employ data from the IMF balance of payments statistics and from the World Development Indicators 
database to compute global licensing revenues. Their time series indicates that worldwide royalty and 
licensing revenues amounted to about USD 10 billion in 1980, and about USD 80 billion in 1998 (Athreye 
and Cantwell 2007, Figure 2). It is unclear which share of this growth is accounted for by within-MNE 
transactions and to what extent transfer pricing issues have been relevant. A 2005 special issue of the 
Economist included an estimate for technology licensing revenues at around USD 100 billion in 2005. 
Slightly less than half of this figure (USD 45 billion) is estimated for licensing and royalties in the USA 
alone. Survey evidence (as in Zuniga and Guellec 2009, p. 16) points to increases in the frequency of 
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licensing and of licensing revenues. Their survey data are particularly telling since they restrict the 
analysis to licensing transactions with unaffiliated firms. Hence, while there is still a need for more 
precise figures, there is some evidence that the market for technology is growing. Despite this evidence, 
if less than one tenth of all patents are licensed (see Section 3 above) then this points to a rather 
incomplete market. 
Another component of technology markets might be the outright sale of patent rights. However, the 
sparse evidence available on patent trade supports the argument that markets for technology are not 
liquid. Recent studies by Serrano (2008) and Burhop (2009) confirm that there is a moderate degree 
of patent trade, probably even larger than many economists had thought. Burhop (2009) finds that 
about 8.3 percent of all patents granted by the German Imperial Patent Office between 1884 and 1913 
were transferred to other owners. Serrano (2008) finds that the rate of transfers in the US has been 
13.5 percent between 1983 and 2002. In both contexts, the share of patents ever traded during their 
statutory lifetime is small, confirming that there may be a high degree of illiquidity in the market. One 
reason for the low degree of trade may lie in the idiosyncratic nature of technology. Many patents 
protect inventions that firms pursue on firm-specific development paths. At the same time, the lack 
of trade may simply reflect the high degree of asymmetric information which may lead to a market 
failure.
Establishing a market for technology would be equivalent to allowing firms to trade intermediate 
inputs and outputs of the innovation process. This would have advantageous effects. First, specialized 
firms may emerge that focus and specialize on particular stages of innovation, for example the design 
stage. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) study the relevance of patents for the emergence of specialized design 
firms in the semiconductor industry. Leaving aside economies of specialization, a liquid and transparent 
market for technology would also alleviate financing constraints by allowing firms to shorten the time 
period from first investment to arriving at an output that can be taken to a market. Financing needs 
for the intermediate steps would be smaller so that the likelihood of financing these steps internally 
would increase. Moreover, with a market at hand loans could possibly be collateralized, opening the 
path to more debt finance. Finally, the likelihood of obtaining private equity finance would also be 
enhanced since the start-up can be liquidated more quickly. The highly illiquid nature of private equity 
currently translates into high premia for the investor, and thus into high costs of finance. 
Markets for technology are not a magical cure. As Gambardella (2002) points out, they may introduce 
new forms of market failures while alleviating others. In particular, they may generate externalities 
related to the complementarity of intermediate inputs to innovation processes. Much more needs to 
be learned about markets for technology, but for present purposes a focus on the positive properties 
seems appropriate. 
Moreover, patents can contribute to the growth of markets for technology in manifold ways. They can 
safeguard the value of assets, lower the costs of transactions, facilitate licensing and technology trade, 
serve as collateral or provide important signals to investors. As Epstein and Pierantozzi (2009) point 
out, patents will also help to recover value in the case of distress or bankruptcy – which will again lower 
the ex-ante cost of capital. These aspects are discussed in the subsequent sections.
4.2  Hybrid business models and “financial bootstrapping”5
Growth-oriented firms are subject to highly cyclical financial environments. Venture capital supply 
and demand have seen strong fluctuations over time. It is not surprising that firms have tried to survive 
periods of scarce finance by somehow reverting to their own means. One strategy has been referred 
5  This section builds on Haagen et al. (2007).
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to as “bootstrapping” – the start-up seeks to slow its growth to the rate that can be supported with 
the financial means at hand. “Bootstrapping” can be supported by the performance of R&D services. 
This allows the firm to maintain a functioning R&D group which can switch back to working on own 
development targets once financial conditions have improved.
In this context, even the promise of the future delivery of know-how and patented inventions may 
serve to support the financing of start-ups. In the 1990s, biotechnology firms developed hybrid business 
models which allowed them to survive extended periods of under-financing by engaging in contract 
R&D for larger firms, mostly from the pharmaceuticals sector. Pharmaceuticals producers have been 
eager to replenish their product pipelines which were threatened by expiring patents and low incidence 
of new clinical entities (NCEs). Rather than internalizing the costly search for NCEs, large firms have 
increasingly sought co-operation with smaller biotechnology firms in the early phases of drug 
development. 
Haagen et al. (2007), in a comparative assessment of British and German biotechnology firms, evaluate 
the extent to which firms make use of such approaches. They show that start-ups in a VC-poor country 
(Germany) engage more often in hybrid models, presumably because other means of finance are not 
available in sufficient volume. Firms with a hybrid business model offer contract research or services 
to third parties in order to finance the company’s own research and development activities. In essence, 
the contractual relationship between firms is that of ex-ante licensing. 63 percent of the German firms 
as compared to 55 percent of British firms follow this ‘bootstrapping’ mode of finance. Focusing on 
the subgroup of firms that are younger than five years, Haagen et al. find that 66 percent of German 
firms compared to 60 percent of British firms pursue a hybrid business model. Nearly half of German 
firms’ personnel resources are devoted to conducting contract research or services to finance the 
company’s own research. Somewhat unexpectedly, the proportion of British firms’ personnel committed 
to contract research or services is also relatively large at about 45 percent. 
The bootstrapping approach may be in conflict with the rapid development of the firms’ own products 
and technologies. After all, firms pursuing a bootstrapping approach choose a form of finance that 
reduces external control, but may delay the growth of the start-up. This may not be optimal. In fact, 
there are often very large rewards for early entrants in large but immature markets. The dominance of 
US firms in emerging technology markets may be due to the fact that they have access to financial 
channels, which allows them to grow quickly. This is presumably not the only reason for the (relative) 
scarcity of fast-growing European high-technology firms, but it may contribute significantly to the 
phenomenon.
4.3  Patents as signals and attractors of external equity finance
The relevance of patents for companies attempting to obtain financial resources, especially in their 
early stages, has been noted repeatedly in the literature (Hayes 1999; Lemley 2000). An important 
source of finance for innovation in high-growth start-ups is external equity which is often supplied by 
venture capitalists (VCs). A product that is proprietary or can otherwise be protected is an important 
selection criterion for VCs (MacMillan 1985). Hence, companies in need of capital will try to obtain 
patents if the cost of doing so is not too high for them.
Patents increase appropriability and thus provide incentives for innovation. In addition, patents facilitate 
the licensing of technology (e.g. Gans et al. 2002). They increase the attractiveness of companies as 
acquisition targets (Cockburn and Wagner 2007) and enable VCs to recover a salvage value from failing 
companies. However, scholars have also documented that “patent strength” varies between industries 
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in that in most industries patents are less featured than other means of protecting innovations, such 
as first-mover advantages or secrecy (Levin et al. 1987). But on average, patents matter for VCs. Baum 
and Silverman (2004) examine selection criteria used by VCs and subsequent company performance. 
They find a positive association between patent applications at the US Patent Office (USPTO) and pre-
IPO financing defined as VC financing and private placements. Interestingly, patent grants have a 
positive but smaller effect than patent applications.
While a large strand of literature has investigated the traditional view of patents as a means of protecting 
intellectual property, Long (2002, p. 625) notes that scholars have overlooked the informational function 
of patents which “may be more valuable to the rights holder than the substance of the rights”. Moreover, 
the information that is relevant to a financier may not just come from the grant event, but from other 
aspects of the patenting process. Recently, a few scholars have shed light on some aspects of the role 
of patents for VC financing. Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) find a positive effect of patents on investors’ 
estimates of company value for a sample of VC-financed semiconductor start-ups. They find larger 
effects for early funding rounds, where information asymmetry is at its largest. In addition, patents 
are particularly valued by more prominent VC investors. Lerner (1994) also documents a positive 
influence of patents on company valuation.
VCs need to make their investment decisions under a high degree of uncertainty. Technology start-ups 
are difficult to evaluate since they do not have a track record which outsiders can use to evaluate their 
potential, they are often years away from first revenues, their assets are mostly intangible and they are 
plagued by a high failure rate. These perils have led VCs to spend a great deal of effort in seeking and 
assessing signals of ventures’ growth potential (Amit et al. 1990; Hall and Hofer 1993) and have driven 
entrepreneurs to undertake symbolic action to gain legitimacy (Zott and Huy 2007). 
The value of signaling lies in the reduction of information asymmetries (Spence 1973) and of information 
costs (Long 2002). In general, the literature has identified three broad categories of signals that are 
relevant for technology-based start-ups. Signals of the first type include educational background as 
well as founder history (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; Burton et al. 2002; Shane and Stuart 2002). 
The second group includes signals in the form of attributes of parties affiliated with a person or 
organization (e.g. Stuart et al. 1999). The third category includes previous accomplishments of the 
start-up company. Patent grants and even patent applications may be considered as such an 
accomplishment, signaling a company’s technical abilities. 
The value of signals generated during the patenting process is that they reduce information asymmetries 
between VCs and the new and unproven company seeking capital, and that they minimize information 
costs for the financiers. Even a patent application which has not been approved yet by a patent office 
may constitute such a signal. The preparation of patent applications requires effort and time, since 
applicants have to follow strict guidelines and need to include technical information in a structured 
manner. This may allow individuals familiar with the patent application requirements to quickly assess 
the strengths and weaknesses of an invention and of the technology employed by the start-up. 
The notion that patents facilitate the acquisition of VC is quite intuitive. From an investor’s perspective, 
a start-up with strong patent rights should be preferred since the patent protects the start-up’s market 
position by allowing it to exclude others from using its proprietary technology. Moreover, should the 
start-up fail the patent may allow VCs to obtain some salvage value. In this regard, patents may both 
serve as valuable assets that enhance the value of the investment in the case of success and in the case 
of failure, and also as signals which certify to some extent that the start-up has at its avail a novel and 
inventive technology. In the latter case, the patent’s function is mainly to act as a seal of quality, possibly 
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reducing the information problem on the investor’s side. Both functions are complementary, but the 
second one could even work for industries in which patent protection is not effective, as long as the 
patent office’s assessment contains new information for the venture capitalist.
Several contributions in the empirical literature suggest that patents can indeed work in the two ways 
just described. Mann and Sager (2007), building on a qualitative study by Mann (2005), investigate the 
relationship between patents and VC availability. They show that there is a significant positive correlation 
between various success measures (number of financing rounds, overall investment, exit status, 
acquisition of late-stage financing and survival span) and measures of patenting activity. They also 
demonstrate that in the software industry, only few start-ups ever have patents (hence, they are a 
relatively scarce asset), that patenting behaviour varies strongly, and that the size of the patent portfolio 
does not matter as much as a simple indicator of patenting activity. Mann and Sager (2007) do not 
have strong evidence in favour of a causal relationship; hence, the results could be caused by “good 
start-ups” being active in patenting and simultaneously being favoured by VC investments without a 
causal impact of patent rights on the financing decision.
Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) bring a new aspect into the discussion and treat patents as quality signals for 
entrepreneurial ventures which have to fight the liabilities of smallness and youth. They find that patent 
filings have a strong association with investor estimates of company value – a doubling of the stock 
of applications is associated with a 28-percent increase in value. Patents are particularly important in 
early financing rounds, valued more highly by prominent VCs, and positively correlated with the 
likelihood of an IPO. Theoretical considerations would predict that founders with more experience 
should profit less from the signalling effect than less experienced ones, but this expectation cannot 
be confirmed. While the authors also estimate panel models (over financing rounds, including an IPO 
round), the claim that the effects of patent filings are causal remains tentative (as in other studies as 
well). Moreover, it seems that the results could be reconciled with the notion that on average, the firms 
simply own valuable assets, and that the VC valuation reflects that.
Haeussler et al. (2008) accept the notion that patents might be signals, but point to a weakness in the 
argument. Usually, the VC investment decision precedes the patent grant considerably. Hence, the 
signal (if there is any) cannot lie in the grant decision of the patent office itself, but must reside in 
other information generated in the course of patent examination. In the US patent system, patents 
are usually taken to be patent grants, since the application used to be unknown to the public. 
Conversely, the European Patent Office (EPO) data used by Haeussler et al. (2008) can be employed 
to trace unsuccessful applications as well as successful ones. The European patent system thus affords 
a much more detailed view of the patenting process, since applications, search reports, grants, 
oppositions and communications between applicant and examiner are observable. This allows the 
authors to test if VCs react more strongly to patents that become – much later on – highly cited and 
to patent oppositions.
Using the timing of events to identify effects, Haeussler et al. (2008) find that in the presence of patent 
applications, VC financing occurs earlier. The results also show that VCs pay attention to patent quality, 
financing those ventures faster which later turn out to have high-quality patents. Patent oppositions 
increase the likelihood of receiving VC, but ultimate grant decisions do not spur VC financing, presumably 
because they are anticipated. The empirical results and additional interviews with VCs suggest that 
the process of patenting generates signals which help to overcome the liabilities of newness faced by 
new ventures. However, it is not the patent application or patent grant per se which certify the start-
up’s quality. It is a diverse set of events which taken together allow VCs sufficiently familiar with the 
patent system to assess the quality of the firm in their portfolio. 
Patenting activity is 
positively correlated 
with company value and 
other success measures.
VOL_2_04_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_2_HARHOFF.indd   86 23/12/09   14:17:03EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°2   2009            87
Taken together, these studies suggest that patents have an important but complex function for start-
ups to secure external finance from VC channels. Patents may in part reflect enhanced appropriability, 
but they may also act as signals which would be hard to obtain in the absence of a patent system. Since 
these functions of patents have only been investigated in the recent literature, there is still no quantitative 
measure of how strongly the institution contributes to the financing of new firms.
4.4  Patents as collateral in debt finance
Researchers have studied the nexus of finance and innovation for more than thirty years now. The 
financing-gap problem has already been described. Venture capital provides a solution in some of the 
cases, but in all likelihood, there are a large number of firms which are subject to financing constraints 
for R&D and innovation, but most of them are unlikely to receive VC. Reasons could be that the growth 
prospects of the firm’s projects – although substantial – are not as high as required from a VC’s point 
of view. Moreover, the entrepreneur or owner may not wish to give up their independence.
In these cases, innovative firms typically tend to lack tangible capital that could be used as collateral 
to obtain external finance. Why can they not make use of their intangible assets to provide collateral? 
In the presence of liquid markets for intellectual property such as patent rights and with some certainty 
given their scope and value, managers could resort to using patents as collateral in debt financing 
transactions. The literature states that there are two reasons why the use of intangibles as collateral in 
debt finance has been limited (e.g. Lev 2001). The first one is that it is often exceedingly difficult to 
come up with an objective valuation of such assets, even from the proprietor’s perspective. Even if a 
valuation existed, asymmetric information could make it hard to communicate the assessment to the 
financier. The second is that in the case of the loan going defunct, the bank will find it typically very 
difficult to sell the asset or commercialize it in some other way. Markets for intellectual property are 
still not well-developed. In other words, the collateral will not provide the intended function as an 
asset that can compensate the bank for the loss from the defunct loan.
Several authors have suggested that the classical view needs to be amended and that extending debt 
finance against intellectual-property (IP) collateral is becoming more common. The argument is in line 
with the “markets-for-technology” view which states that technology is increasingly being traded in 
some form of market transactions. While there is some systematic evidence of the latter, there is no 
comprehensive statistical data that would capture the extent to which loans are granted in exchange 
for IP collateral. As an upper bound, a recent KfW survey of 4,300 German SMEs yielded the result that 
in 2007, only 2.2 percent of the surveyed firms used intangible assets as collateral (KfW 2007). Given 
that these assets may include trademarks, copyright, patents and other IP rights, the share of firms 
using patents as collateral is likely to be less than one in a hundred.
The phenomenon should nonetheless not be belittled. It is true that only few specialist financiers offer 
such services today, and the use of patents for collateral is still largely experimental and non-standard. 
But this form of financing innovation has true potential and could make a major contribution in 
improving overall conditions for innovation. To get a flavour of such transactions consider the example 
of ESKA Implants GmbH & Co KG, a producer of joint replacements reported in Schlemvogt (2009). The 
company needed capital for expanding its product range and service network to complete a turn-
around. The main bank was willing to accept patents as collateral. An external valuation specialist 
identified 320 relevant patent rights which were valued at EUR 3.5 to 5.0 million. The bank then accepted 
the respective portfolio (with a risk adjustment of 30 to 50 percent) as collateral. The company remained 
the owner of its patents in these transactions.
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Several factors are currently counteracting the use of patents as collateral. Banks are still highly sceptical, 
and loan officers typically point to the lack of expertise in dealing with complex IP issues. The inclusion 
of IP specialists is likely to raise the costs of such transactions. Moreover, the high risk regarding the 
liquidation value of the collateralized IP also reduces the extent to which it can be used. It is not 
uncommon that the collateral value of IP in such debt finance transactions is below ten percent of its 
value to the proprietor. Nonetheless, even such a low valuation may provide the firm with sufficient 
credit to perform sizeable innovation activities. As a consequence, an increase in innovation activity 
would be the consequence of past inventive activities. 
It is too early to assess the relevance of these developments and to give predictions about the future 
potential of IP-collateralized debt finance for innovation. With improvements and standardization in 
valuation techniques, with greater liquidity in markets for patents and licenses, and with greater 
openness towards innovative financing instruments on behalf of banks, a significant financing branch 
could emerge. Some banks could evolve into specialists handling such transactions and become lead 
debt-holders in syndicated transactions. Debt transactions of this type could be handled either by 
“house banks” with the support of patent valuation specialists or by specialist banks which offer 
valuation and extension of debt in one organization. Clearly, the new form of financing requires both 
relational as well as transactional competencies. 
Offering this option as an additional source of finance would be welfare-improving since the extent 
of funding gaps (in particular for SMEs) could be reduced. Yet, there are important obstacles. A significant 
shift towards this form of financing would necessitate that loan officers in banks have technical expertise 
as well as legal and business training. Clearly, this would constitute a major change. Moreover, there 
is an open question if temporary support via public banks (e.g. the KfW in Germany), government 
support or coordinated EU-wide measures could accelerate the development of a new and stable 
private financing mechanism for innovation. These questions will be discussed below.
4.5  Patent funds
Patent funds are one of the most interesting types of commercialization vehicles. While IP funds are 
not a recent invention,6 they have been rising in importance recently. Some US patent funds have 
gained an ambivalent reputation for extorting license payments by making intensive use of legal 
threats or full-fledged litigation (e.g. see Business Week 2006). The European situation is different, 
presumably because the litigation system does not grant the kind of strategic opportunities available 
in the US system. There are other differences as well. While US commercialization of patents is usually 
undertaken by stock-listed firms, European patent funds are typically closed investment funds which 
require investors to hold on to their investments for a time period of four years or more. Investors are 
compensated for the illiquidity of the investment with relatively high returns – most patent funds 
announce return expectations between approximately 10 and 20 percent after taxes.
Two types of funds have been set up in recent years – “blind pools” and “asset pools”.7 In blind pools, 
6  Less recent examples include the British Technology Group (BTG) which was founded in 1995. BTG seeks to commercialize 
patent rights in the field of pharmaceutical and medical inventions. BTG has been expanding its portfolio by several large-
scale acquisitions, e.g. in 2000 when Siemens AG transferred a portfolio of about 1800 patents to BTG.
7  Deutsche Bank has set up three asset-pool funds, starting with Patent Select I in 2006, while Credit Suisse established 
a blind-pool fund in 2004/2005 already. Euram Bank has set up three blind-pool patent funds, starting in 2007. Little is 
known about fund performance to date; returns from the first fund are supposed to be distributed in 2009/10. Fund 
volume has been increasing, and minimum investments have been declining from 50,000 EUR in 2005 to 10,000 EUR in 
2008. The total fund volume is currently of the order of 300 million EUR and is expected to grow further. For a practitioner’s 
view on these funds, see Lipfert and Ostler (2008).
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the patent portfolio to be commercialized has not been selected yet – the performance of the pool 
rides mostly on the fund managers’ talent in detecting, acquiring and commercializing patents. In 
asset pools, the intermediary makes an up-front investment in selecting the patent portfolio and then 
invites investors to fund the subsequent commercialization process. Asset pools are considerably less 
risky for the investor than blind pools, but the intermediary will have to be compensated for the set-up 
costs and shifting of risk and returns are lower than in the case of blind-pool funds. While the first 
generation of European patent funds was privately placed, subsequent funds have been marketed as 
investments to a broader group of investors.
From an analytical perspective, investments in patent funds are still largely unknown entities, and 
more research is needed to describe their characteristics reliably. Understandably, the information 
provided by fund managers themselves tends to veer to the optimistic side. The claim made by fund 
managers that patent fund investments are largely uncorrelated with investments in other asset classes 
(e.g. Lipfert and Ostler 2008, p. 265 and BIT 2008, p. 51 and p. 71) have not been substantiated in 
independent research. Moreover, the performance expectations appear to be relatively high at this 
point, and may be seriously affected by the current economic crisis. How patent funds will weather 
the current decline in IP activity and the trend towards a more restrictive granting of such rights remains 
to be seen. Despite these sceptical remarks, this new form of IP monetization can support the financing 
of innovative companies. It should therefore be welcome. The setup of funds whose commercialization 
strategy relies heavily on litigation and threat of litigation is likely to receive a more critical assessment. 
The discussion of these practices is taken up in the next section.
5.  Patent systems and the financing of innovation
5.1  Parameters of patent system design
The rules of the patent system are important determinants of the new financing and exchange 
institutions that are currently springing up. Given the focus of this paper, the central question is how 
the patent system should be designed to facilitate the financing function of patents and licenses. If it 
is true that patents make it easier for innovative firms to obtain finance or to license their inventions, 
then a well-functioning patent system also has a positive effect on innovation through this channel. 
This is a welfare component of the patent system that has only recently found attention and that still 
needs further study.8 If patents facilitate the emergence of new markets or even the competitive entry 
of new firms into existing markets with innovative products, then the simple juxtaposition of welfare 
losses due to exclusion rights (market power) and of welfare gains due to innovation does not hold. 
To stretch the argument somewhat, absent the patent there would be no entry (i.e., competition) and 
no innovation. 
Various questions need to be answered in this context. Is there a trade-off between what is good for 
financing innovation and social welfare maximisation of patent systems more broadly? Is a poorly 
designed patent system an impedi  ment for innovation finance? And is the European Patent System 
conducive to allowing the use of patents to procure external finance? 
The main aspect to be considered when answering these questions is the extent of uncertainty about 
patent rights. It should be recalled that patent rights can support the financing of innovative companies 
since they may help to reduce informational asymmetries. But if patent rights themselves are highly 
8  To the best of my knowledge Bronwyn Hall has been the first to make this point. Hall (2007) contains a detailed discussion 
of the role of patents for start-up firms and for competition.
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uncertain regarding the scope of the concomitant exclusion right, then their effect in reducing 
informational asymmetries is likely to be small. Moreover, with uncertain patent rights it will be difficult 
to establish liquid and transparent markets for patents and licenses. Hence, for a patent system to 
support the emergence of new financing channels, it needs to provide well-delineated patent rights. 
Finally, the granting and scope decision should come quickly in order to support firms in the initial 
stages of innovation, when financial constraints are particularly pronounced. 
A full-fledged discussion of patent system design is well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will 
focus on a limited number of parameters which are particularly important for achieving reasonable 
trade-offs. These are the timing of decisions, the quality and precision of the examination and the cost 
of patenting (as perceived by the applicant). Aspects of the patent-litigation system are discussed in 
the next sub-section. These characteristics are strongly related – higher quality and faster examination 
are likely to require more resources than low-quality, slow decision-making.
From the perspective of any stakeholder, the optimal patent system would simply arrive at precise and 
reliable decisions almost immediately and at almost no cost to the applicant or society at large. 
Obviously, this ideal system does not exist due to trade-offs between precision, duration and costs. 
Consider the issue of precision first. To simplify somewhat, decisions by patent authorities are subject 
to two types of errors. An error of type I consists in not granting a patent to an applicant with a truly 
novel and inventive technology. Conversely, an error of type II occurs when a patent is granted to an 
undeserving application, e.g. when the technology already exists or the inventive step is too small to 
deserve patent protection. Clearly, minimizing the likelihood of any error will require resources. 
Moreover, it may require time – irrespective of resources. Some information is simply generated by 
time passing by and cannot be replicated easily by investing more private resources. Hence, an immediate 
examination would not be optimal, especially in new technical fields. This argument has been made 
by Regibeau and Rockett (2007). 
Since efforts to avoid errors will tend to increase the duration and costs of patent examination, it is 
clear that a patent system supportive of the new financing functions will involve complex trade-offs. 
A look at the empirical literature supports this view. There is strong evidence that (i) longer time lags 
in patent examination create uncertainty (Schankerman and Galasso 2007; Gans et al. 2008); (ii) some 
applicants seek to increase uncertainty for their rivals and therefore delay examination proceedings 
(Harhoff and Wagner 2009); (iii) quick decisions are typically less precise than slower ones, in particular 
in new technical fields (Regibeau and Rocket 2009); (iv) systems which allow applicants to delay 
examination (deferred examination) lead to a significant reduction of the examination workload; 
and (v) systems with a large inflow of “marginal” applications create additional uncertainty for all 
players because the state of the art can no longer be determined reliably (McGinley 2008 and 
Opperman 2009).
The current situation of the European Patent Office (EPO) and of the national patent offices in Europe 
and beyond is not satisfactory. The EPO has accumulated a major backlog of applications. Moreover, 
applicants are increasingly resorting to tactics of delay and artificial complexity in their filings (McGinley 
2009). After some time period in which the EPO had tried to accommodate the quantity objectives of 
its “clients”, the office has now switched to a quality-oriented approach. It has established practices 
towards “raising the bar” which will result in lower grant rates and sanctions (higher fees) for abusive 
practices. This approach needs to be supported by policy makers in Europe, and by the leadership of 
national patent offices. The reform measures undertaken at the EPO need further support. This 
conclusion is not new, and it is broadly supported in the academic literature – see Harhoff (2006) and 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for further comments and references. Yet some stakeholders 
such as legal representatives see private value in an ever-expanding patent system. Furthermore, 
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patent offices themselves may be “self-interested”. After all, these are organizations with legal and 
implicit commitments to their employees who would wish to see secure pension funds, high degrees 
of job security and comparatively high salary levels. Complex issues of fairness, labour market 
competition and long-term incentives in the patent office need to be considered. The political economy 
of patent systems may therefore be far more complex than the optimization of these systems in terms 
of welfare and efficiency. It is probably the most neglected aspect in the current academic discussion.
While it is clear that patent office operations should be as efficient as possible, there is no reason to 
believe that the price of patenting should necessarily be as low as the marginal costs of operating a 
patent office (which should be as low as possible in order to have patent offices work efficiently). The 
cost of patenting (as perceived from the applicant) is a screening device that will deter applicants with 
low-value, marginal applications. Thus, a low-price system is likely to invite a large number of marginal 
applications which would clog the patent system, with subsequent problems for examination quality. 
Even some US practitioners are now conceding that this has been the fate of the US patent system 
(Oppermann 2009). Fees and filing costs are an important determinant of actual applicant behaviour 
– they should therefore be considered appropriate instruments of patent policies. A policy of providing 
patent protection at the lowest possible cost to the applicant without considering the implications for 
filing volumes is seriously misguided.
Finally, the backlogs at the major patent offices create uncertainty with respect to the state of the art 
and the scope of protection. If granting decisions cannot be produced quickly, then the patent system 
should generate precise information that allows knowledgeable experts to arrive at reasonably precise 
estimates of subsequent decisions at later stages. In that regard, the European system does well since 
the written communication between applicant and examiner is made public in the EPO’s file inspection 
system. 
5.2  Patent litigation
Despite the infrequent occurrence of patent litigation (in particular at appeal levels), the patent litigation 
framework has a particularly important impact on patenting practice, patent office behaviour and on 
emerging markets for technology. Patent-litigation cases occur in two basic forms: either as revocation 
proceedings challenging the validity of patents granted by the respective patent authority or as 
infringement proceedings seeking to enforce patent rights. The likelihood of a patent being involved 
in litigation at some point during its term is estimated at between 1 and 3 percent in most patent 
systems, with some variation across technical domains, industries and countries. It is particularly high 
in the US and still relatively low in Europe. Patent litigation is known to occur particularly frequently (i) 
for valuable patents; (ii) as assessments of case quality become more divergent; and (iii) as the distribution 
of information becomes increasingly asymmetric. Patent litigation is “the tail that wags the dog of the 
patent system” – litigated cases provide legal precedence and important signals to patent holders, 
potential infringers and third parties seeking to steer free of patent conflicts. A well-designed litigation 
system is therefore the capstone of any patent system. Conversely, a flawed litigation system may 
effectively counteract any welfare gains from the system or cause welfare losses of its own.
The “ascendancy of intangibles”, as Lev (2001) has termed recent developments, has led to the emergence 
of new types of players and intermediaries. The so-called “patent troll” has become the most notable 
one. Using the patent litigation system to extort license payments has been referred to in the literature 
as “trolling” which is not an illegal practice, but seeks to exploit structural and procedural weaknesses 
of the patent and judicial system to earn rents. See Reitzig et al. (2007) for a detailed analysis of the 
“troll” business model. Since these rents may not be compensated by welfare gains, trolling is likely to 
be welfare-reducing. 
A low-price patent 
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Various features of the US patent and litigation system may contribute to the widespread occurrence 
of trolling in the US. The following aspects have been named as supportive of patent trolling: 
High costs of legal proceedings; •	
Cost allocation rules in court (both parties bear their own costs); •	
Contingency fee payments for lawyers, creating incentives for lawsuits; •	
High damage awards and risk of treble damages in the case of “wilful infringement”; •	
Pro-patentee posture of US courts and juries; •	
Low examination quality creating uncertainty about the scope of protection; •	
General and broadly defined extension of patentable subject matter to software and business  •	
methods; and
Quick and indiscriminate availability of injunctions •	 9 which can be used to create economic 
pressure.
The exact extent of “trolling” in Europe is unknown. Certainly, the practice has not played the prominent 
role that is has in the US. On the other hand, several patent funds have purchased several thousands 
of patents, and the first court actions by “trolls” may already be pending in Europe. The weaker presence 
of “trolls” is presumably due to the fact that the patent system in Europe deviates from the US system 
in several crucial points. In Europe, (i) court proceedings are much less costly; (ii) cost allocation favours 
the winning party; (iii) damage awards are not excessive; (iv) most courts have sought a careful balance 
between the rights of the parties and have not followed a systematic pro-patent posture; (v) injunctions 
are not issued automatically; and (vi) the quality of patent examination has been considerably better 
than in the US, despite some weakening. However, one should not assume that the European system 
is “troll-proof”. 
Current efforts to transform the fragmented European patent litigation system into a unified court 
need to take these and other considerations into account. A patent litigation system in which parties 
duplicate their controversies in national courts is no longer appropriate for the European economy. 
But the reform towards the unified system needs to assure that the current balance of power between 
parties is maintained. The Czech EU Presidency, in Working Document 5072/09 (Draft Agreement on 
the European and Community Patents Court and Draft Statute, dated January 8th, 2009) has put forth 
a new proposal for a unified Patent Court, to be named ”European and Community Patents Court”. 
Essentially, the proposal foresees the establishment of a unified patent court which will cover both 
European patents and future Community patents. This proposal has revived the policy discussion. It 
describes a good starting point for creating a unified system without creating loopholes that could 
be exploited by patent trolls. A more detailed discussion is given in Harhoff (2009).
Most importantly, patent litigation should occur at relatively low cost for litigants. As a US judge once 
noted, high litigation costs distort patent trade and the patent system.10 They would be dangerous to 
an emerging market for technology and new financing channels.
9    In May 2006, the US Supreme Court decided to put and end to quasi-automatic injunctions in the US litigation system. 
These were one of the major instruments used by trolls to exert pressure on presumed infringers. See eBay Inc v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S 388(2006).
10    Ellis (2000): “(…) It is, simply put, that the escalating, indeed skyrocketing litigation costs of the 1970’s and 1980’s have 
distorted patent markets and patent economics.” This comment concerns the development in the United States.
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6.  Conclusions and policy implications
It has long been known that innovation activity may not only be impeded by classical knowledge 
externalities, but also by financing constraints. These arise due to informational asymmetries that are 
particularly pronounced in the early stages of innovative processes and technology creation. Traditional 
debt finance and public equity markets cannot close these funding gaps, and relatively new forms of 
private equity, such as venture capital, reach only the small portion of start-up firms which are likely 
to generate a particularly high rate of return. 
New forms of innovation finance are emerging, however. While these do not play a major role at this point, 
policy makers and managers should pay attention to these new developments. Supported by changes 
in valuation techniques and accounting regulation, it seems likely that patent rights will increasingly be 
used as collateral in debt finance. Moreover, patent funds may become an important source of finance 
for owners of patents. When intermediate outputs of the innovation process become increasingly tradable 
for financing reasons, a more liquid and transparent market for technology will emerge. 
The two developments – enhanced availability of finance and improved markets for technology – are 
complementary, but they depend crucially on the appropriate design of patent systems. The more 
uncertain patent rights are, the less likely is it that the new forms of finance will play a major role, and 
the more will markets for technology be impacted by information asymmetries that drive up the cost 
of innovation finance. Thus, the trend towards high quantities of low-quality patents needs to be 
stopped. The pro-quantity stance of some patent offices needs to give way to a strategy in favour of 
well-delineated and reasonably secure property rights. There is even the possibility of a virtuous cycle 
in which high-quality patent rights lead to an improvement of the financing situation for SMEs and 
young firms, and ultimately to more research, innovation and high-quality inventions. Paradoxically, 
the path towards the virtuous cycle will require cutting the number of patent grants from currently 
inflationary to much lower future levels, with a concomitant improvement of inventive step and value. 
Policy-makers need to learn that patent offices are not the modern analogue of the alchemist who 
promises the transmutation of common metals into gold. They are more like central banks – printing 
too much money may lead to inflation and uncertainty, and thus undermine growth.
These comments are of course partly speculative. To advise policy makers more objectively, there is a 
need for more reliable and objective data and sober analysis. In future research, a comprehensive 
annual survey of banks could help to measure the extent to which patents are already being employed 
as collateral in debt financing. More detailed data on licensing and patent transfers are required to 
study the development of markets for technology. Moreover, a Europe-wide listing or collection of 
information on patent funds would be helpful to describe the state of the emerging fund market more 
reliably. It is also clear that further policy interventions should support the emerging markets. The 
market for licenses is in dire need of more transparency. Such transparency might be achieved by 
changing the reporting requirements for licensing transactions as proposed by Lemley and Myhrvold 
(2007). But the issues are complex – in some cases the emergence of a market for technology will 
benefit from allowing for anonymous transactions in order to avoid situations in which a party showing 
interest in a license is immediately threatened with litigation in order to drive up prices. 
Summing up, there are promising signs of a positive scenario of markets for technology and improved 
innovation financing, in particular when measures are taken to make these exchanges more transparent 
and less prone to opportunistic rent extortion. Such a development would reduce informational 
asymmetries and quasi-rents, yield lower prices for technology, allow for greater specialization and 
lower capital costs for innovative firms. All of this would be welcome news for European entrepreneurs, 
managers and policy makers alike.
Greater availability of 
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